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Case Summary

Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-Defendants proved for purposes of fiduciary analysis that a merger was entirely
fair, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, as there was ample evidence indicating that the original deal
price of $2.97 per share and the final deal price of $5.00 per share were fair to the acquired
company and its minority stockholders; the original deal price of $2.97 per share was the product
of arm's-length bargaining, and market indications also supported the fairness of the price, and
particularly considering their contentious opposition to the merger at lower prices, approval of
the merger at $5.00 per share by a supermajority of the acquired company's minority
stockholders was compelling evidence that the price was fair; [2]-The fair value for the acquired
company on the date of the merger as a result of a discounted cash flow valuation was $2.13 per
share.

Outcome
The merger was found to be entirely fair, and for purposes of the appraisal proceeding the fair
value of the acquired company on the closing date was $2.13 per share.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Causes of Action
Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Allocation
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Fiduciary Duties
View more legal topics
HN1 Controlling Shareholders, Causes of Action
To determine whether a corporate fiduciary has breached its duties, a court examines the
fiduciary's conduct through the lens of a standard of review. When a transaction involving selfdealing by a controlling shareholder is challenged, the applicable standard of judicial review is
entire fairness, with the defendants having the burden of persuasion. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Fiduciary Duties
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HN2 Controlling Shareholders, Fiduciary Duties
A shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it owns a majority interest in or exercises control
over the business affairs of the corporation. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Causes of Action
Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Allocation
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Fiduciary Duties
View more legal topics
HN3 Controlling Shareholders, Causes of Action
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when entire fairness applies, the defendant
fiduciaries bear the burden of proving fairness unless they seek and obtain a pretrial
determination that the burden should be allocated differently. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Causes of Action
HN4 Controlling Shareholders, Causes of Action
When a stockholder plaintiff challenges a transaction between a corporation and its controlling
stockholder, the governing standard of review is entire fairness. Fairness does not depend on the
parties' subjective beliefs. Once entire fairness applies, the defendants must establish to the
court's satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price. The
concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. Although the two aspects
may be examined in turn, they are not separate elements of a two-part test. The test for fairness is
not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue must be examined
as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Duties & Liabilities > Controlling
Shareholders > Fiduciary Duties
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
HN5 Controlling Shareholders, Fiduciary Duties
The fair dealing aspect of the unitary entire fairness standard embraces questions of when the
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and
how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained. As with the overarching
issue of fairness, the various dimensions of fair dealing can elide, such that a particular instance
of unfair dealing undermines multiple aspects of the process. This is often the case when a
controller engages in an act of unfair dealing that it subsequently fails to disclose. In those
situations, the act both provides evidence of unfairness in its own right and gives rise to an
additional instance of unfairness in the form of a disclosure violation. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
View more legal topics
HN6 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers
The fair price aspect of the entire fairness test relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock. The economic inquiry called for by the fair price aspect is the same as the fair
value standard under the appraisal statute. The two standards differ, however, in that the
appraisal statute requires that the court determine a point estimate for fair value measured in
dollars and cents. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h). The fair price aspect of the entire fairness test,
by contrast, is not in itself a remedial calculation. The entire fairness test is a standard of review
that is applied to identify a fiduciary breach. For purposes of determining fairness, as opposed to
crafting a remedy, the court's task is not to pick a single number, but to determine whether the
transaction price falls within a range of fairness. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
View more legal topics
HN7 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers
When evaluating the question of fiduciary breach, the court considers whether a reasonable
seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard the transaction as within a range of fair
value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept. This standard recognizes the reality that the
value of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values. Applying this
standard, a court could conclude that a price fell within a range of fairness that would not support
fiduciary liability, and yet the point calculation demanded by the appraisal statute could yield an
award in excess of the merger price. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
HN8 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
Consistent with the unitary nature of the entire fairness test, the fair process and fair price aspects
interact. The range of fairness has most salience when the controller has established a process
that simulates arm's-length bargaining, supported by appropriate procedural protections. A strong
record of fair dealing can influence the fair price inquiry and lead to a conclusion that the price
was fair. But the range of fairness is not a safe-harbor that permits controllers to extract barely
fair transactions. Factors such as coercion, the misuse of confidential information, secret
conflicts, or fraud could lead a court to hold that a transaction that fell within the range of
fairness was nevertheless unfair compared to what faithful fiduciaries could have achieved.
Under those circumstances, the appropriate remedy can be a "fairer" price or an award of
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rescissory damages. Just as a fair process can support the price, an unfair process can taint the
price. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
HN9 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
Fair dealing encompasses an evaluation of how the transaction was initiated. The scope of this
factor is not limited to the controller's formal act of making the proposal; it encompasses actions
taken by the controller in the period leading up to the formal proposal. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
HN10 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
Delaware decisions have recognized that a calculated effort to depress the market price of a stock
until the minority stockholders are eliminated by merger or some other form of acquisition
constitutes unfair dealing. By parity of reasoning, depriving the controlled company of business
opportunities in a calculated effort to depress its value also constitutes unfair dealing. More
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
View more legal topics
HN11 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers
Fair dealing encompasses questions of how the transaction is negotiated and structured.
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

More

Business & Corporate Law > Agency Relationships > Fiduciaries > Fiduciary Duties
Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
HN12 Fiduciaries, Fiduciary Duties
An important element of an effective special committee is that it be fully informed in making its
determination. In order to make a special committee structure work it is necessary that a
controlling shareholder disclose fully all the material facts and circumstances surrounding the
transaction. Although the underlying disclosure obligation derives from trust law and the duty of
loyalty that a fiduciary owes its beneficiary, modern applications focus on the goal of replicating
arm's-length negotiations. Seen in this light, the controller's duty of disclosure stops at the point
when forcing disclosure would undermine the potential for arm's-length negotiations to take
place. Consequently, there are some categories of information that while possibly material to the
decision must not be disclosed in order for a negotiation to occur at all. The clearest example
would involve information disclosing the top price that a proposed buyer would be willing or
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able to pay. A controller similarly is not required to disclose private information that reveals how
a controller values the company and hence what the controller is willing to pay. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN13 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
Fair dealing encompasses questions of how the approvals of the stockholders were obtained.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > Agency Relationships > Fiduciaries > Fiduciary Duties
HN14 Fiduciaries, Fiduciary Duties
A fiduciary may not use superior information or knowledge to mislead others in the performance
of their own fiduciary obligations. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN15 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
A transaction is structurally coercive if stockholders do not have the freedom to choose between
the status quo and the deal consideration. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN16 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
The fair price aspect can be the predominant consideration in the unitary entire fairness inquiry.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN17 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
Entire fairness review will be significantly influenced by the work product of a properly
functioning special committee of independent directors. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN18 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
A merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of collusion is
a very strong indication of fair value. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
HN19 Mergers, Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders
The range of fairness concept has most salience when the controller has established a process
that simulates arm's-length bargaining, supported by appropriate procedural protections. More
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN20 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
In an entire fairness analysis, the issue of how stockholder approval was obtained will be
significantly influenced by the affirmative vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN21 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
In the context of mergers, the unitary entire fairness standard requires a singular determination of
fairness. This judgment concerning "fairness" will inevitably constitute a judicial judgment that
in some respects is reflective of subjective reactions to the facts of a case. The concept of
fairness is of course not a technical concept. No litmus paper can be found or Geiger counter
invented that will make determinations of fairness objective. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers
HN22 Mergers & Acquisitions Law, Mergers
Perfection is not possible, or expected as a condition precedent to a judicial determination of
entire fairness. The Delaware Supreme Court has characterized the proper "test of fairness" as
whether the minority stockholder shall receive the substantial equivalent in value of what he had
before. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Torts > Intentional Torts > Breach of Fiduciary Duty > Elements
HN23 Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Elements
A claim for aiding and abetting requires an underlying breach of fiduciary duty.
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

More like this

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
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HN24 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended to provide shareholders
dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings. Delaware's appraisal
statute requires that the court determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation. Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h). When determining fair value, the statute instructs the court to take into
account all relevant factors. In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has
discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general framework or to fashion its
own. It is entirely proper for the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's model,
methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation is supported by credible
evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis on the record. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN25 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
The basic concept of value under the Delaware appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled
to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern. When applying this standard, the corporation must be valued as a going concern based
upon the operative reality of the company as of the time of the merger, taking into account its
particular market position in light of future prospects. A determination of fair value assesses the
value of the company as a going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.
Consequently, the appraisal statute requires that the court exclude any synergies present in the
deal price—that is, value arising solely from the deal. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN26 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
The consideration that the buyer agrees to provide in the deal and that the seller agrees to accept
is one form of market price data, which Delaware courts have long considered in appraisal
proceedings. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN27 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
In the context of appraisals, a discounted cash flow analysis is an established method of
determining the going concern value of a corporation. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN28 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
The first key to a reliable discounted cash flow analysis is the availability of reliable projections
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of future expected cash flows, preferably derived from contemporaneous management
projections prepared in the ordinary course of business. Delaware law clearly prefers valuations
based on contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily
has the best first-hand knowledge of the company's operations. When management projections
are made in the ordinary course of business, they are generally deemed reliable. The Court of
Chancery of Delaware has rejected projections that were not prepared in the ordinary course of
business and which showed the influence of the transactional dynamics in which they were
created. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN29 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
In the context of appraisals, without a valid explanation, the use of a generic growth rate is
inherently flawed and unreasonable. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN30 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
In the context of appraisals, the Court of Chancery of Delaware clearly must add the value of
non-operating assets to an earnings based valuation analysis. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
HN31 Mergers, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders
In the context of appraisals, it is entirely proper for the Court of Chancery to adopt any one
expert's model, methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation is
supported by credible evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis on the record. More
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Counsel: [*1] Stephen E. Jenkins, Marie M. Degnan, ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Lawrence S. Robbins, Kathryn S. Zecca, Ariel N. Lavinbuk, William J. Trunk, Joshua
S. Bolian, Shai D. Bronshtein, Peter B. Siegal, ROBBINS, RUSSELL, ENGLERT, ORSECK,
UNTEREINER & SAUBER, LLP, Washington, DC, Counsel for Plaintiffs ACP Master, Ltd.,
Aurelius Capital Master, Ltd., and Aurelius Opportunities Fund II, LLC.
Robert S. Saunders, Jennifer C. Voss, Ronald N. Brown, III, Arthur R. Bookout, SKADDEN,
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Counsel for Defendants
Sprint Corporation, Sprint Communications, Inc., and Respondent Clearwire Corporation.
Donald J. Wolfe, Jr., Matthew E. Fischer, Christopher N. Kelly, POTTER ANDERSON &
CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Erik J. Olson, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, Palo
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Alto, California; James P. Bennett, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, San Francisco, California;
James E. Hough, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, Tokyo, Japan; James J. Beha II,
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, New York, New York, Counsel for Defendants Starburst I,
Inc., and Softbank Corp.
Judges: LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
Opinion by: LASTER

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
In July 2013, Clearwire Corporation ("Clearwire" [*2] or the "Company") and Sprint Nextel
Corporation ("Sprint") completed a merger in which Sprint paid $5.00 per share to acquire the
49.8% of Clearwire's equity that Sprint did not already own (the "Clearwire-Sprint Merger").
Sprint's acquisition of Clearwire was part of a broader effort by Softbank Corp. ("Softbank"), the
largest telecommunications company in Japan, to enter the United States cellular telephone
market. Contemporaneously with the closing of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger, Softbank acquired
majority control of Sprint (the "Sprint-Softbank Transaction").
Entities associated with Aurelius Capital Management, LP (collectively, "Aurelius") held shares
of Clearwire common stock when the Clearwire-Sprint Merger closed. Aurelius filed a plenary
lawsuit which contended that the merger resulted from breaches of fiduciary duty by Sprint,
aided and abetted by Softbank. Aurelius also filed a statutory appraisal proceeding. The cases
were consolidated and tried.
For purposes of the plenary action, assuming that entire fairness is the governing standard of
review, Sprint proved at trial that the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was entirely fair. Judgment is
entered in Sprint's favor on the claim [*3] for breach of fiduciary duty and in Softbank's favor
on the claim for aiding and abetting.
For purposes of the appraisal proceeding, Sprint proved that the fair value of the Company's
common stock at the effective time of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was $2.13 per share. Aurelius
did not prove its more aggressive valuation contentions. Judgment in the appraisal proceeding is
entered in favor of Aurelius for that amount, plus interest at the legal rate, compounded
quarterly.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial lasted ten days. The parties introduced over 2,500 exhibits and lodged twenty-nine
depositions. Eleven fact witnesses and seven experts testified live. The laudably thorough pretrial order contained 547 paragraphs. The pre-trial and post-trial briefing totaled 766 pages. The
following facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

A. Clearwire
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Clearwire was a small telecommunications company that had assembled a large block of 2.5
GHz spectrum. Its major stockholder was Eagle River Holdings, LLC, an affiliate of Craig
McCaw, a cellular telephone pioneer.
Sprint had assembled another large block of 2.5 GHz spectrum. In 2008, as part of a complex,
multi-party recapitalization, Sprint contributed [*4] its block to Clearwire and received a 51%
ownership stake in the Company. Comcast, Intel, Time Warner Cable, BHN Spectrum
Investments, and Google (collectively, the "Strategic Investors") contributed cash to Clearwire
and received, collectively, a 22% ownership stake. Eagle River retained a 5% ownership stake.
The remaining 22% was publicly traded.
As part of the recapitalization, Clearwire, Sprint, Eagle River, and the Strategic Investors entered
into an Equityholders' Agreement.1 It called for the Clearwire board of directors (the
"Clearwire Board") to have thirteen members. Sprint could appoint seven directors, but one had
to be independent of Sprint. Eagle River could appoint one director. The Strategic Investors
collectively could appoint four directors. Clearwire's Nominating Committee appointed the final
director.2 The Equityholders' Agreement required that any merger between Sprint and
Clearwire prior to November 28, 2013 receive the approval of a majority of the shares
unaffiliated with Sprint.3
With Sprint's 2.5 GHz holdings added to its own, Clearwire became the largest private holder of
wireless spectrum in the United States. Clearwire used the cash it received from the
Strategic [*5] Investors to build the world's first fourth generation (4G) mobile network. The
plan was for Sprint and the Strategic Investors to buy capacity on Clearwire's network at
wholesale rates, then resell or use it themselves. Sprint and Clearwire quickly concluded a
capacity agreement (the "Wholesale Agreement"). The other Strategic Investors never did.
With Sprint as its only customer, Clearwire struggled to achieve consistent profitability.
Clearwire's business prospects deteriorated further when the 4G standard Clearwire had
chosen—WiMAX—lost out in the marketplace to a competing standard—Long-Term Evolution
("LTE").
In fall 2010, the Clearwire Board created a Strategic Committee charged with exploring
alternatives for Clearwire. Its members were John Stanton, Theodore Schell, and Dennis Hersch.
At the time, all were independent, outside directors.4 They considered a variety of alternatives,
including issuing debt, selling spectrum, and selling the Company as a whole.
In 2011, Stanton took the helm as Clearwire's Chairman and interim CEO. The Company's
situation remained poor. Clearwire's auditors had added a going-concern qualification to its
financial statements. In June 2011, Sprint gave [*6] back a portion of its Clearwire shares to
lower its ownership to 49.8%, thereby ensuring that if Clearwire defaulted on its debt, it would
not trigger a cross-default for Sprint. Clearwire's only path to survival required building an LTE
network, but Clearwire lacked the necessary capital, and it was already burdened by debt from
building its WiMAX network.

B. Clearwire Turns To Sprint.
In summer 2011, Clearwire approached Sprint about switching its network from WiMAX to
LTE. Clearwire mentioned a possible merger, but Sprint did not take up the invitation. The
parties instead focused on renegotiating the Wholesale Agreement. In a version of buyer
financing, Clearwire wanted Sprint to advance the payments it would make to purchase capacity
on a fully built-out LTE network so that Clearwire could use those funds to construct the
11

network. Clearwire also wanted Sprint to make minimum-purchase commitments. Sprint wanted
Clearwire to lower its rates. The negotiations were contentious and dragged on into the fall.
In November 2011, after many bumps in the road, Sprint and Clearwire reached agreement on an
amendment to the Wholesale Agreement. Sprint agreed to pay Clearwire $926 million for
unlimited [*7] WiMAX services during 2012 and 2013 plus fees ranging from $5 to $6 per
gigabyte for all other data sent over Clearwire's network. Sprint also agreed to help fund the
build-out of an LTE network by making up to $350 million in prepayments for data capacity.
The prepayments were conditioned on Clearwire having 5,000 LTE sites in service by the end of
2013, and 8,000 LTE sites in service by the end of 2014. The amendment gave Sprint a right of
first refusal on any sale of Clearwire's "core spectrum."5
After Clearwire and Sprint amended the Wholesale Agreement, Clearwire's stock rebounded to
$2.50 per share. Clearwire was able to raise $715.5 million through an equity offering. Clearwire
also secured $295 million in debt financing.
But the good news was short-lived. In December 2011, three of the Strategic Investors (Comcast,
Time Warner, and BHN) announced an agreement with Verizon that eliminated their need to buy
capacity from Clearwire. A few months later, Google sold all of its Clearwire equity for $2.26
per share. Clearwire's efforts to find new customers continued to go nowhere. In the first half of
2012, Clearwire explored a variety of potential transactions with AT&T, T-Mobile, [*8] and
MetroPCS. None of them bore fruit.6
At a meeting of the Clearwire Board on July 24, 2012, management told the Board that
Clearwire had "sufficient cash to get through the first half of 2013" but would either need to slow
the LTE network build or obtain additional financing to survive beyond that.7 Management
was not optimistic about other alternatives, stating: "We believe we have talked to every
conceivable party with which to partner seriously in the last year," but without achieving any
success.8

C. The Sprint-Softbank Transaction
Softbank's founder, chairman and CEO, Masayoshi Son, wanted to enter the U.S. cellular
telephone market. In 2012, four players dominated that market: AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and TMobile. AT&T and Verizon were the largest. Son wanted to acquire Sprint and T-Mobile, merge
them into one company, and compete with AT&T and Verizon.
Son planned for the combined company to use Clearwire's 2.5 GHz spectrum. Softbank had
successfully built a network in Japan using 2.5 GHz spectrum, and Son believed Softbank could
do the same in the United States. Softbank singled out Clearwire's spectrum as "Key for Our
Success in US."9 Son planned for Sprint to acquire Clearwire so [*9] that Sprint could use the
spectrum fully.10
In July 2012, Softbank began parallel negotiations with Sprint and T-Mobile. Sprint was
receptive; T-Mobile was not. Although the idea of a three-party merger was put on hold, Son did
not give up. He decided that Softbank would buy Sprint first.
In September 2012, Softbank and Sprint reached agreement on the Sprint-Softbank Transaction.
Softbank would acquire a 70% stake in Sprint and provide Sprint with approximately $8 billion
in capital. The plan contemplated Sprint using some of the capital to take Clearwire private.
Softbank anticipated that Sprint would pay $2.00 per share to acquire the minority stake in
Clearwire.11
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To finance the Sprint-Softbank Transaction, Softbank needed to borrow approximately $18
billion. Softbank's lending syndicate conditioned the loan on Sprint having the right to appoint a
majority of the members of the Clearwire Board.12 The Equityholders' Agreement made this
complicated, because it required that one of Sprint's designees be independent of Sprint. For
complex reasons that are beyond the scope of this decision, Sprint concluded that the solution lay
in buying the Clearwire shares owned by Eagle River [*10] or one of the Strategic Investors.

D. Sprint Approaches Clearwire and Eagle River.
Sprint decided to try to reach agreement with Clearwire and with either Eagle River or one of the
Strategic Investors before news of the Sprint-Softbank Transaction leaked. On October 5, 2012,
Keith Cowan, Sprint's President of Strategic Planning, contacted Stanton and told him that Sprint
"would consider making [an] offer for all [Clearwire] shares at [a] low price."13 Without
explaining why, Cowan told Stanton that the transaction was "urgent and needs to be done in the
next 8-10 days."14 Cowan asked Stanton to get the Strategic Investors and Eagle River to
waive their right under the Equityholders' Agreement to have thirty days' advance notice before
Sprint began negotiating a merger with Clearwire.
On October 8, 2012, Stanton met with Dan Hesse, Sprint's CEO, who "expresse[d] a strong
desire" to buy Clearwire.15 Like Cowan, Hesse emphasized that the matter was "urgent and
needs to be done in the next two weeks," without telling Stanton why.16 Stanton told Hesse
that he thought the Clearwire Board would support a merger at $2.00 per share. At the time,
Clearwire's stock was trading around $1.30 per share.
During [*11] the same period, members of Sprint management reached out to Eagle River and
the Strategic Investors about buying their shares. The Sprint representatives did not disclose
Softbank's interest in Sprint or its consequences for Clearwire.17

E. The Sprint-Softbank Transaction Leaks.
On October 11, 2012, the news of the Sprint-Softbank Transaction appeared in the press.18
Analysts speculated that Clearwire was an important part of Son's vision for Sprint. Clearwire's
stock rose over 70% on October 11, closing at $2.22 per share.
Stanton called Hesse after the news broke. Given Clearwire's stock price, a deal at $2.00 no
longer made sense. Stanton told Hesse that Sprint should make a "fair offer."19 Hesse told
Stanton that Sprint planned to buy out one of the Strategic Investors. Stanton reported the call to
the Strategic Committee.20 He expressed concern about Sprint buying out a Strategic Investor
because it would let Sprint control the Clearwire Board: "[I]f Sprint appoints their insiders to our
board . . . they will incrementally erode our ability to effectively serve our non-Sprint
shareholders . . . ."21
The leak of the Sprint-Softbank Transaction caused Eagle River to realize that it
had [*12] considerable bargaining leverage against Sprint. Exploiting its leverage, Eagle River
negotiated a sale of its block to Sprint at $2.97 per share. Under the Equityholders' Agreement,
the other Strategic Investors had a right of first offer for the shares. None of them exercised their
right.

F. Stanton Tries To Elicit An Offer From Sprint.
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Sprint and Softbank tried to respond to the leak about their transaction by pretending that they
did not want to acquire Clearwire immediately. On October 13, 2012, Hesse and Cowan each
spoke with Stanton and said that Sprint and Softbank had no plans to buy out Clearwire's
minority stockholders.22 Stanton asked to speak with a representative of Softbank, and Sprint
arranged a call with Ronald Fisher, Softbank's Vice Chairman and one of Son's key deputies. In
preparation for the call, Cowan advised Fisher to avoid tipping their hand:
[Stanton] will want to engage you in direct discussions to buy the Company as quickly as
possible after the announcement, or see whether you will support [Sprint] in engaging with them
asap. Instead, I suggest that you indicate that your inclination is to take baby steps while your
transaction with us is pending . . . while [*13] you are also willing to support some "lifeline"
(i.e. dilutive) equity investments, and then be ready to consider a larger transaction (or not) once
our deal closes. His reaction to that approach will tell you a lot, and potentially set a much better
tone for any acquisition discussions.23
Stanton and Fisher spoke on October 15, 2012. Fisher stuck to the party line and told Stanton
that Softbank and Sprint had no immediate plans to acquire Clearwire, although they did want to
appoint additional representatives to the Clearwire Board. Stanton asked if he could meet with
Son, and Fisher agreed.24
Stanton continued to think that a near-term deal with Sprint was in the best interests of Clearwire
and its minority stockholders, so he tried to persuade Sprint and Softbank to make an offer. On
October 22, 2012, he spoke with Fisher again.25 Stanton told Fisher that the status quo was
untenable and Clearwire would run out of money in less than a year. Stanton argued that
renegotiating the Wholesale Agreement was a temporary fix. He told Fisher that a merger
between Sprint and Clearwire was the only permanent solution.
Clearwire also tried to raise capital by selling spectrum. In October 2012,
Clearwire [*14] exchanged proposals with DISH. DISH wanted to enter into the cellular
wireless market and had recently purchased a large quantity of spectrum from several bankrupt
wireless operators. DISH was in the process of obtaining approval from the FCC to deploy this
spectrum, but it lacked a network of its own. DISH thus represented both a potential purchaser of
Clearwire's spectrum and a potential strategic partner.
Clearwire also engaged in discussions with Qualcomm. When Hesse and Son got wind of
Clearwire's discussions, they called various Qualcomm executives and told them that Sprint
would have to approve any sale of Clearwire's spectrum. Stanton believed that Sprint and
Softbank's calls "damaged [Clearwire's] credibility with Qualcomm and made it more difficult
for us to do a transaction with them."26 Stanton reported the incident to the Clearwire Board
and expressed concern that "Sprint appears to be attempting to cut us off from our
alternatives."27

G. The November 2 Meeting
On November 2, 2012, Stanton met with Son, Fisher, and Hesse in Palo Alto. Stanton made a
detailed presentation designed to convince Son to acquire Clearwire.28 He extolled the
comparative advantages of a merger, [*15] estimating that it would yield $3 billion in synergies.
He also attempted to put pressure on Sprint and Softbank by saying that Clearwire would have to
sell its spectrum to raise capital without a merger. Rather than proposing a price, Stanton
presented a range of values that ran from $2.11 per share (Clearwire's current market price) to
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$9.00 per share (a valuation implied from spectrum values ranging from $.17/MHz-pop to
$.39/MHz-pop).29
Stanton recounted the price discussions in an e-mail he sent to the Strategic Committee on
November 4.
We then talked price. I asserted that Sprint had set a minimum price with their $2.97 per share
agreement with Eagle River and said that regardless how that pricing came about, that our
shareholders (particularly the [Strategic Investors]) would not accept a lower price than Eagle
River. Dan [Hesse] pushed back hard arguing that the undisturbed Clearwire price was $1.30 and
that we should take a reasonable premium over that price . . . I also noted that our stock was
already over $2.00 and that they had to pay a premium over that price. I responded that that
current price reflects a market perception that there had previously been a significant [*16] risk
of bankruptcy and that the Sprint-Softbank deal had effectively eliminated that risk and thus a
much higher price was now expected . . . I also . . . pointed out that $2.97 was about 20¢ per
MHZ pop which was reasonable based on other recent transactions. During this conversation
they asked if Comcast and Intel would accept the $2.97 price to which I responded that I did not
know, but that I was relatively certain they would not accept a lower price.30
Fisher and Son recalled the meeting differently. Fisher remembered Stanton saying, "At $2.97, I
can deliver the shareholders. At $2.96, I cannot."31 Son remembered the same statement,
which he interpreted as a commitment to do a deal at $2.97 per share. Within hours of the
November 2 meeting, a Sprint executive e-mailed his team: "Full speed ahead. Likely 2.97 per
share. Start thinking about . . . modeling what the acquisition would look like."32
On November 5, 2012, the members of Clearwire's Strategic Committee and its Audit
Committee held a combined meeting. The directors agreed on the need to establish a new
independent committee to oversee negotiations with Sprint. They also agreed that Clearwire
would need interim financing from Sprint [*17] as part of any deal to address its short-term
liquidity needs.33

H. Softbank Lines Up Intel.
Son wanted Sprint to acquire Clearwire before the Sprint-Softbank Transaction closed.34 To
move quickly, Sprint needed to convince the remaining Strategic Investors to waive their notice
rights under the Equityholders' Agreement.
Intel was a Strategic Investor and the largest Clearwire stockholder after Sprint, with 12.9% of
the non-Sprint shares. Sprint had antagonized Intel by attempting to buy its shares without
disclosing its discussions with Softbank. Since then, Intel had refused to waive its notice
rights.35
On November 7, 2012, Son called Paul Otellini, the CEO of Intel. Otellini recounted the meeting
in an e-mail he sent to his deputies the following day:
The heart of [Son's] request is our [C]learwire stock. He has been convinced by Dan [Hesse] and
John [Stanton] that [Clearwire] will run out of money soon and needs to be recapitalized and
they want to buy back the stock of the [S]trategic [I]nvestors before the [S]print deal closes 6
months from now.
I told him we have no strategic reason to hold the stock, but that our selling it needs to be tied to
a broader business arrangement with Softbank companies. We talked specifically [*18] about
android handsets built for his networks in Japan, Indonesia . . . and Sprint. He needs 40M
handsets a year to feed these carriers. He would like a strategic relationship with us to supply
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them along with tablets. He is interested in android at this time, but is very intrigued by the
business [opportunity] that Taizen [i.e. an operating system used by Intel] represents.36
The quid pro quo was simple and straightforward: Intel would support the Clearwire-Sprint
Merger in return for a broader business arrangement with Softbank.
The next day, November 8, 2012, Son met with other Intel executives and agreed that Softbank
would launch an Intel-based phone in three major countries in 2013.37 On November 9,
Otellini's deputy, Arvind Sodhani, told Fisher that Intel was prepared to support Sprint's
acquisition of Clearwire and was looking forward to working with Softbank on "strategic
opportunities."38 On November 12, Sodhani advised Fisher that Intel had waived its notice
rights. Sodhani told Fisher that Intel was very excited about "the strategic project that had been
discussed with [Son]" and that "[t]o show their support for this new relationship, Intel would like
to invest any proceeds" from [*19] the Clearwire-Sprint Merger in Softbank stock.39

I. Negotiations Begin.
On November 9, 2012, Hesse told Stanton that Sprint was working on an offer to acquire
Clearwire's minority shares. Fisher called Stanton later that day to express Softbank's support.40
On November 13, 2012, the Clearwire Board formed a committee to negotiate with Sprint (the
"Special Committee"). Its members were Hersch and Schell, who had served on the Strategic
Committee, and Kathleen Rae, another outside director. None had any ties to Sprint. The
Clearwire Board resolved that it would not authorize or approve a transaction with Sprint without
the Special Committee's affirmative recommendation. The Special Committee expected the
negotiations to be straightforward. As Schell put it at the time, "[T]here isn't going to be a
process of soliciting other buyers; it's not a competitive deal . . . its [sic] a price negotiation and
we kind of even know where we are going to wind up on it."41
The Special Committee decided to have Stanton lead the negotiations with Sprint because he was
a "legendary figure in the telecommunications world" who "would have enormous credibility and
impact in negotiating with Sprint and Softbank."42 Stanton [*20] thought he could generate a
competitive dynamic with Sprint by finding buyers for Clearwire's spectrum.43 On November
14, 2012, Clearwire sent DISH a non-binding term sheet for a spectrum sale. DISH told
Clearwire that it needed to receive FCC approval of a pending application for its satellite
spectrum before it could engage.44
On November 21, 2013, Sprint sent Clearwire its initial offer of $2.60 per share. The price
represented a 22% premium over Clearwire's closing price of $2.12 per share on the prior day.
As part of the deal, Sprint proposed to provide Clearwire with up to $600 million in debt
financing, convertible into Clearwire stock at $1.25 per share.
On December 3, 2013, the Special Committee met to consider Sprint's proposal and discuss
alternatives. One option was a spectrum sale, but although that alternative would provide some
immediate liquidity, "it would not solve [Clearwire's] longer-term liquidity needs . . . ."45
Another option was bankruptcy, but the Special Committee thought that "it was difficult to
expect greater equity value in a restructuring transaction than Sprint's initial $2.60 per share
proposal."46 The Special Committee decided to counter at $3.15 per [*21] share. The Special
Committee also asked for $800 million in interim financing and an exchange rate of $2.20 per
share.47
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J. The Accelerated Build
Also on December 3, 2012, Sprint representatives informed Stanton that Softbank wanted to
dramatically expand Clearwire's LTE network build beyond what was contemplated by the
Wholesale Agreement (the "Accelerated Build"). Clearwire's current plan had anticipated 5,000
new sites by the end of 2013; Softbank wanted Clearwire to build 12,500 sites.48 Sprint and
Softbank offered to finance the incremental sites and "to increase their revenue commitment to
[Clearwire] to cover the continuing costs of long term operation of those sites in the event the
deal did not close, for any reason."49
The Accelerated Build represented a huge undertaking for Sprint.50 On December 4, 2012,
Stanton told Hesse that Clearwire was "more than happy to discuss" the Accelerated Build but
that the parties needed "to get on the same page."51 Stanton noted that although the Sprint
representatives had mentioned building 7,500 additional sites, Sprint's formal proposal
contemplated building as many as 11,000 additional sites, for a total of 16,000 new sites in
2013.52 Stanton [*22] proposed that Clearwire and Sprint first finish negotiating the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger.
On December 6, 2012, Sprint raised its offer for Clearwire to $2.80 per share. Sprint agreed to
increase the amount of interim debt financing to $800 million but would only increase the
conversion price to $1.50 per share.53 On the same day, DISH offered to buy approximately
11.4 billion MHz-pops of spectrum from Clearwire for approximately $2.2 billion, with an
option to purchase or lease additional spectrum.54
On December 7, 2012, the Special Committee directed Stanton to continue negotiating with
Sprint and to reiterate Clearwire's demand for $3.15 per share.55 Two days later, Sprint
increased its offer to $2.90 per share. The Special Committee again stood firm at $3.15 per
share.56
On December 11, 2012, Sprint completed its purchase of shares from Eagle River for $2.97 per
share. After the purchase, Sprint controlled 50.4% of Clearwire's voting power.57

K. Son Draws a Line in the Sand.
When Son learned that the Special Committee was continuing to demand $3.15 per share, he was
furious.58 Son believed that Stanton "had made a commitment to [him] in California to do this
deal at $2.97."59 Fisher relayed Son's [*23] reaction to Stanton, who informed the Special
Committee that Softbank "would approve an offer at $2.97 per share and would not offer a
higher price 'as a matter of principle.'"60
Rather than immediately accepting Son's price, Clearwire continued to explore the alternative of
selling spectrum.61 After DISH refused to increase its offer, Clearwire reached out to other
parties, including Google. Google said it wasn't interested in a transaction.62 Google actually
was interested, but Google had contacted Sprint previously about Clearwire's spectrum, and
Sprint convinced Google to wait until after Sprint and Softbank acquired Clearwire.63
On December 16, 2012, the members of Clearwire's Special Committee and its Audit Committee
held a joint meeting.64 The committees received a fairness opinion from Centerview, the
Special Committee's financial advisor. Centerview compared the $2.97 per share price to
numerous metrics for valuing Clearwire. These metrics included a discounted cash flow ("DCF")
analysis of two sets of revenue projections prepared by Clearwire's management in the ordinary
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course of business. The first set of projections were the Single Customer Case, which assumed
that Sprint would [*24] remain Clearwire's only major wholesale customer. The second set of
projections were the Multi Customer Case, which assumed that Clearwire would obtain
additional wholesale customers and therefore additional revenue.
Sprint also prepared internal projections of its wholesale payments to Clearwire. Sprint did not
provide its own projections to the Special Committee during the negotiations of the ClearwireSprint Merger. Consequently, Centerview did not consider Sprint's internal projections in its
fairness opinion.
Centerview's DCF analysis under the Multi Customer Case indicated that Clearwire's value
exceeded Sprint's $2.97 per share offer. The Special Committee recognized, however, that the
Multi Customer Case was not a viable plan because Clearwire "still didn't have any prospect of
having a second customer."65 The Special Committee and Centerview both regarded the Single
Customer Case as Clearwire's operative reality. Centerview's DCF analysis under the Single
Customer Case indicated that Clearwire's value was no greater than $0.75 per share. Centerview
therefore concluded that Sprint's offer was fair to Clearwire's minority stockholders.
Supported by Centerview's fairness [*25] opinion, the Special Committee resolved that $2.97
per share was a fair price for Clearwire and recommended that the Clearwire Board approve the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger. Immediately following the joint meeting, the Clearwire Board met and
adopted the Special Committee's recommendation.
On December 17, 2012, Clearwire and Sprint signed a merger agreement. As required by the
Equityholders' Agreement, the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was conditioned on approval of a vote of
a majority of the non-Sprint shares.
In a related agreement, Sprint agreed to provide Clearwire with up to $800 million in interim
financing (the "Note Purchase Agreement"). Clearwire could draw on the financing in ten
monthly installments of $80 million. The resulting notes had a 1% coupon and could be
converted into Clearwire shares at $1.50 per share.
Intel and the other Strategic Investors entered into a Voting and Support Agreement with Sprint
and an accompanying Right of First Offer Agreement. In the Voting and Support Agreement, the
Strategic Investors committed to vote for the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. In the Right of First Offer
Agreement, Sprint committed to buy, and the Strategic Investors to sell their shares at [*26] the
price offered in the merger agreement if the merger did not close.66

L. Reactions To The Merger
Clearwire's investors reacted negatively to the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. Investors told Clearwire
that the price of $2.97 per share was inadequate. They also objected to the Note Purchase
Agreement as "dilutive and coercive."67 On December 21, 2012, Hesse reported to Son and
Fisher that "[t]he activism of the dissident [Clearwire] shareholders is apparently picking up, not
only buying shares but reaching out to other [Clearwire] equity holders to vote against the
transaction."68
DISH's reaction to the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was more consequential. On December 28, 2012,
DISH proposed to tender for up to 100% of Clearwire's outstanding common stock at $3.30 per
share. DISH also offered to provide Clearwire with interim financing in lieu of the Note
Purchase Agreement. DISH conditioned its offer on receiving the right to appoint directors to the
Clearwire Board and other governance rights, including the right to veto "material transactions
with related parties (including Sprint) unless these transactions were approved by [a committee
18

of independent directors]."69 Alternatively, DISH proposed to [*27] buy 11.4 billion MHzpops of Clearwire's spectrum for $2.18 billion.
DISH's intervention at $3.30 per share changed the negotiating landscape. The Special
Committee instructed Stanton to engage with DISH.70 DISH's appearance also energized
stockholder opposition to the merger.

M. Negotiations With DISH End.
DISH's demands for governance rights ran contrary to the terms of the Equityholders'
Agreement. Throughout January and February 2013, the Special Committee analyzed how DISH
could make an actionable proposal. The Special Committee believed that "[t]he key to
leveraging" Softbank and Sprint was "to figure out what we can deliver to [DISH] in terms of
governance, etc."71 To signal the sincerity of their effort, the Special Committee caused
Clearwire to decline the January and February draws under the Note Purchase Agreement.72
By February 2013, however, the Special Committee had come to doubt its ability to navigate
around Sprint's contractual rights. On February 26, the Special Committee decided that
Clearwire would accept the March draw under the Note Purchase Agreement.73 DISH
expressed its strong disapproval and terminated discussions.74
With DISH out of the picture, Clearwire [*28] scheduled the stockholder vote on the merger for
May 21, 2013. Clearwire subsequently accepted the April draw under the Note Purchase
Agreement."75

N. Two New Developments
In April 2013, the Special Committee confronted two new developments. The first was an
alternative source of interim financing. Aurelius, the plaintiff in this case, and Crest, another
large stockholder that had already sued Sprint and Clearwire's directors for breaching their
fiduciary duties in connection with the Clearwire-Sprint Merger, offered Clearwire $320 million
in debt financing, convertible into Clearwire equity at $2.00 per share.76 The conversion price
was superior to the Note Purchase Agreement, so the Special Committee asked Sprint to waive
its blocking rights and permit Clearwire to access the financing. Sprint refused.77
The second development was an offer from Verizon to buy spectrum leases held by Clearwire
for the twenty-five largest markets in the United States, covering approximately 5 billion MHzpops. Verizon's proposal valued Clearwire's spectrum between $.22 and $.30 per MHz-pop.78
The Special Committee directed management to engage with Verizon, but doubted that a
spectrum sale "could resolve the [*29] fundamental liquidity issues [Clearwire] faced . . . ."79
In addition, Sprint had the right under the Wholesale Agreement to veto any sale of Clearwire's
core spectrum, making the transaction non-viable unless Sprint consented.

O. DISH Re-Engages.
After dropping off the map for more than a month, DISH reemerged in April 2013 with a
surprising new tactic. On April 15, 2013, DISH submitted an unsolicited proposal to Sprint's
board of directors for a merger between DISH and Sprint.80 DISH thought that its merger
proposal would encourage Clearwire's stockholders to vote down the Clearwire-Sprint Merger,
and that Clearwire would then file for bankruptcy. Because DISH had accumulated a large stake
19

in Clearwire's debt, it could then acquire Clearwire's spectrum cheaply through a bankruptcy
auction.
Stanton tried to use DISH's involvement to extract a price increase. On April 16, 2013, Stanton
explained to Fisher and Hesse that DISH "now holds a blocking position in several classes of
[Clearwire's] debt securities" and that if Clearwire's stockholders "vote no on our transaction . . .
Dish has the strongest position to buy the assets of the company."81 Stanton also reported that
stockholders remained [*30] opposed to the merger.82 Stanton exhorted Fisher and Hesse "to
increase your price soon."83 But Sprint and Softbank continued to resist a price increase.84

P. Clearwire and Sprint Solicit Stockholder Support.
On April 23, 2013, Clearwire and Sprint filed a joint definitive proxy statement in support of the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger.85 In the section explaining its recommendation in favor of the
merger, the Special Committee told stockholders that $2.97 per share was a fair price and that the
merger was "more favorable to our unaffiliated stockholders when compared with other strategic
alternatives . . . ."86 Sprint similarly recommended the merger as "substantively and
procedurally fair to [Clearwire's] unaffiliated stockholders . . . ."87 Sprint justified this claim by
pointing to "the fact that Comcast, [BHN] and Intel, who collectively own approximately 13% of
the Company's voting shares . . . have agreed to vote their shares in favor of the Merger
Agreement . . . ."88
On May 3, 2013, four large Clearwire stockholders—Mount Kellett, Glenview Capital, Highside
Capital, and Chesapeake Partners—formed a group to oppose the merger.89 They collectively
held a significant percentage of Clearwire's [*31] unaffiliated shares.90 The parties called
them the "Gang of Four."
On May 5, 2013, the Finance Committee of Sprint's board of directors held a meeting. Michael
Schwartz, Sprint's head of corporate development, "proposed that the Committee consider either
increasing the consideration offered to Clearwire's shareholders . . . or arrange for financing to
help prevent a Clearwire bankruptcy in the event of a 'no' vote."91 Schwartz reasoned as
follows:
• "Without a Clearwire acquisition, Sprint will have to pay for both (1) capacity on the Clearwire
network (current agreement is $5-6 per GB) plus (2) what could be significant fees to secure
access to deploy 2.5 GHz spectrum [on] the Sprint network. Such payments could exceed the
build out and operating costs that would be incurred if transaction closes."
• "Sprint plans to rapidly deploy 2.5 GHz LTE."
• "Clearwire could take certain actions that would most likely result in significant delays to
network development."
• "[S]print may transfer value to other shareholders through wholesale payments (~33% of every
$1 based on no-vote ownership) plus spectrum lease payments."
• "Clearwire may become more valuable as Sprint traffic and payments increase." [*32] 92
Schwartz told the Finance Committee that Clearwire would require additional funding if the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger was rejected or delayed. He proposed that Sprint issue $1 billion in
convertible debt at an exchange price of $2.00 per share.93
After Schwartz's presentation, the Finance Committee "recommended that management increase
the consideration offered to Clearwire shareholders to $3.50 per share, subject to Softbank's
consent . . . ." The Finance Committee also resolved to "continue to work on the financing plan"
as a fallback.94
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Q. Son's Roadshow Backfires.
While Sprint was trying to marshal stockholder support for the Clearwire-Sprint Merger,
Softbank was trying to marshal stockholder support for the Sprint-Softbank Transaction. On May
8-10, 2013, Son and Fisher met with a series of large Sprint stockholders. Many of the investors
also held large positions in Clearwire.
In an effort to convince the investors to support the Sprint-Softbank Transaction, Son spoke of
his vision for Sprint and its ability to use Clearwire's spectrum. He described Clearwire as "The
Treasure" and explained that his "path to achieving his 300-year vision leads to [Clearwire].95
He also contradicted arguments [*33] that Clearwire and Sprint had been making in favor of
their deal. For example, he told the investors that new technology "would allow [Softbank] to
build out 2.5 spectrum at significantly lower capex," which undermined Clearwire and Sprint's
arguments that the 2.5 GHz spectrum was not as valuable as other bands.96 He told investors
that Clearwire was "essential to his strategy and as a result, they would not [Clearwire] go
bankrupt,"97 which undercut Cleawire and Sprint's arguments about Clearwire's financial
viability. He also told the investors that if the Clearwire-Sprint Merger failed, "any subsequent
deal to acquire the [Clearwire] minority stake would be structured so they wouldn't require a
majority of the minority and shareholders could pursue appraisal rights if they didn't agree with
the takeout price."98
Son's candor doomed the stockholder vote on the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. On May 15, 2013,
Stanton told Hesse and Fisher that the "vote will fail."99 Stanton urged Sprint and Softbank to
increase their price. He told Hesse and Fisher that, if the merger was voted down, the Clearwire
Board was considering defaulting on a $250 million interest payment due on June 1.

R. Sprint Increases [*34] Its Offer.
Faced with a certain no-vote, Softbank relented and agreed to a price increase. On May 20, 2013,
Sprint increased its offer to $3.40 per share, telling Clearwire that it was its "best and final
offer."100 On May 21, Clearwire convened its meeting of stockholders and immediately
adjourned the vote until May 31.101
But the bump was not enough for Clearwire's dissident stockholders, many of whom had heard
Son's presentations about the value of Clearwire. Citing Son's comments, they told Stanton that
they believed Clearwire's value to be still higher.102 In an e-mail, Stanton told Hesse and
Fisher that one large stockholder was "on the fence at 2.97" before Son's roadshow, but now
believed that "Clearwire was worth $4-5."103 Exasperated, Hesse replied to Fisher: "omg."104
At Stanton's behest, Fisher agreed to "keep [Son] away from shareholders" until after the
stockholder vote.105 From that point on, Fisher took the lead for Softbank in speaking with
Clearwire stockholders. Together, Sprint and Softbank adopted a carrot-and-stick approach:
emphasize the financial benefits of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger, while also threaten to take
control of the Clearwire Board and dilute [*35] the minority stockholders if they voted down the
merger. Sprint's talking points for investor calls highlight the latter dimension of the strategy.
While we have no specific board approved plan in the event of a no vote, we would likely do a
mix of the following:
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1. Provide convertible/exchangeable capital at conversion/exchange prices significantly below
the original $2.97/offer. We would expect to offer the public pro-rata participation in these down
rounds.
2. We would expect this process to be executed repeatedly over time.
3. We would expect to designate our rights with respect to board governance (designate 7 Sprint
representatives).
4. We would expect to buy the [Strategic Investors'] shares (this would raise Sprint's ownership
to 68%).
5. Once the standstill [in the Equityholders' Agreement] expires in November, we may, from
time to time, make open market purchases or provide tender offers in order to provide liquidity
in market.106
Fisher and Stanton successfully persuaded a few large stockholders to support the ClearwireSprint Merger at $3.40 per share. Nonetheless, it appeared that Clearwire's stockholders would
still vote down the merger.107

S. DISH Tops Again.
For a third [*36] time, DISH shook up the deal landscape. On May 29, 2013, DISH offered to
purchase up to 100% of Clearwire's shares for $4.40 per share.108 DISH conditioned its offer
on receiving the same governance protections it had asked for in January, but DISH did not
condition its offer "on the absence or failure of" any challenge by Sprint to DISH's requested
governance rights.109 DISH also offered interim financing of up to $80 million per month
exchangeable at $2.50 per share.
During a meeting on May 30, 2013, the Special Committee resolved to (i) adjourn the
stockholder meeting until at least June 13, (ii) make the June 1 interest payment on Clearwire's
debt, and (iii) decline the $80 million June draw under the Note Purchase Agreement.110
Sprint's board of directors also met on May 30, 2013. Management gave a presentation that
outlined the components of Sprint's plans in the event of a no vote:
• "Execute plan to name new Sprint Directors (7 of 13)."
• "To avoid potential cross-default risk, Sprint plans to reduce voting interest below 50%, similar
to what has been done in the past."
• "[P]rovide Clearwire with $320 million of financing to insure Clearwire makes [its] June 1
interest payment."
• "Financing will [*37] be required for Clearwire to continue operating in 2013, make the
December interest payment, and continue operations into 2014 (approximately $1B)."
• "MVNO Agreement — Sprint's existing agreement to purchase 4G capacity from Clearwire is
perpetual; 2014 and beyond pricing is $6 per GB declining to $5 per GB based on volume; 2014
4G payments estimated to be approximately ~$500M, subject to Clearwire build-out and Sprint
customer usage."
• "Spectrum Use Agreement — to execute our current strategy, we will need to negotiate an
agreement to buy, lease, or deploy on Clearwire spectrum."111
Management elaborated on Sprint's options with a decision tree. Sprint's "mid-to-long term plan"
in the decision tree flowed to two options: "Restructuring" and "Status Quo." The following
items were listed under "Status Quo:"
• "Exercise all rights (e.g. change board)."
• "Ongoing financing of ~$1B for first year."
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• "Consider offering to re-finance Clearwire's [$2.9 billion] callable debt . . . which is secured by
spectrum."
• "Negotiate an agreement to gain access to 2.5 GHz on Sprint sites."
• "Attempt to renegotiate MVNO rates."
• "Consider increasing ownership stake post Standstill (Nov[ember] 2013)."
• "Concerns regarding [*38] viability of Clearwire as a standalone entity without additional
wholesale customers or financing."112
On June 5, 2013, the Special Committee and the Clearwire Board changed their recommendation
on the Clearwire-Sprint Merger.113 Hersch told Stanton that the move "maximize[s] our
leverage with Sprint . . . and improve[s] our chances of getting a bump."114

T. Sprint And Softbank Consider Whether To Bump Again.
DISH's tender offer exposed a fault line between Softbank and Sprint. Sprint wanted to top
DISH's offer. Softbank did not. Topping DISH's offer would increase the total price for
Clearwire by at least $1 billion, which Softbank felt was "a big number for a company that . . .
was burning cash and had high leverage."115 Softbank had often left a public float in
companies where it acquired control (including in its then-pending Sprint-Softbank Transaction),
and Son was comfortable with Sprint doing the same with Clearwire.116
Faced with a likely no-vote, Sprint took a hard look at its ability to achieve Son's vision if Sprint
did not own Clearwire. Led by Schwartz, employees from Sprint's finance, network, and
corporate development groups spent two weeks analyzing possible scenarios. They summarized
their work in a [*39] PowerPoint presentation titled "Clearwire Alternatives," which Hesse
requested to help convince Fisher and Son to top DISH's bid.117 The presentation discussed
four options.
The first option was to increase the merger consideration and acquire Clearwire. The
presentation outlined the cost of topping DISH's bid at various price points.
The second option was to not acquire Clearwire but still use Clearwire's spectrum as if Sprint
owned Clearwire. This scenario was called the "Full Build." Schwartz described its creation as a
"mechanical exercise"118 in which he assumed (i) consummation of the Sprint-Softbank
Transaction, (ii) consummation of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger, and (iii) rapid deployment of 2.5
GHz LTE spectrum on 38,000 sites, which was what Softbank planned to do if the ClearwireSprint Merger succeeded. Schwartz then backed out merger-related costs and made various
assumptions about the terms on which Sprint would use Clearwire's spectrum as a wholesale
purchaser.
The third option was to not acquire Clearwire and only build out Clearwire's spectrum to the
extent envisioned by the Wholesale Agreement. This was called the "Limited Build." It assumed:
(i) Sprint's "current sub[scriber] forecast," [*40] (ii) Sprint's "current [forecasted] tonnage
growth", (iii) Sprint's "current spectrum holdings," and (iv) Clearwire's construction of 5300
LTE sites by the end of 2013.119 Sprint also modeled a variation of the Limited Build where
Clearwire constructed 8000 LTE sites.
The fourth option was to find other spectrum that Sprint might use to satisfy network demands.
None of the alternatives were viable. Son described them as either "stupid," "too expensive," or
"wouldn't work."120
To my eye, the Clearwire Alternatives presentation seems designed to lead a reader to the
conclusion that the only rational path was to increase the merger price, which was what Sprint
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wanted. Son had his chief technology officer analyze the presentation.121 He told Son that the
Full Build was "difficult to understand since a detailed calculation is not available . . . , but [my]
feeling is, 'really?'"122 He agreed that the Limited Build was feasible, but cautioned that it
provided at best a "temporary solution."123
Sprint's board of directors was scheduled to meet on June 17, 2013. To prepare for the meeting,
Schwartz and the corporate development team created detailed financial models for Sprint under
the Full Build and [*41] the Limited Build.124 They also created a full set of projections for
Clearwire's standalone business under the Full Build (the "Full Build Projections").125
Clearwire's revenue under the Full Build Projections far exceeded its revenue under any other set
of projections. The Full Build Projections forecasted that Sprint would pay Clearwire $20.9
billion in wholesale payments from 2013 to 2018, compared to $4.7 billion under the Single
Customer Case prepared by Clearwire's management.
Schwartz's team also modeled Sprint's financial profile under the Limited Build. Contrary to
Schwartz's expectations, their model indicated that the Limited Build was financially superior to
the Full Build. The projected loss of subscribers under the Limited Build was "more than offset
by the savings from the much lower 2.5 tonnage and resulting payment to [Clearwire]."126
Both the Full Build and the Limited Build, however, were "materially worse than the scenarios
where the [Clearwire] deal closes."127 Sprint's best option was to increase its offer for
Clearwire.

U. Sprint Decides to Increase Its Offer Again.
On June 17, 2013, Sprint's board of directors met as scheduled. Schwartz attended the meeting
and gave a [*42] presentation to the board. A slide titled "Rationale for Updated Approach"
listed several justifications for increasing the merger consideration:
• "Sprint's preference is to acquire 100% of Clearwire, but with a fall back position if that was
not possible, Sprint could reasonably expect to enter into a commercial agreement that would
provide access to 2.5 GHz. There was also a possible path to acquiring Clearwire at a later date
at a reasonable price."
• "Dish tender creates a significant risk to this plan. If Dish obtains its desired stake and some or
all of its desired governance rights, Sprint may not be able to (1) enter into a commercially
reasonable agreement with Clearwire to access 2.5GHz, and (2) acquire the remaining stake in
Clearwire at a reasonable price."
• "There has been no change to the intrinsic value of Clearwire . . . All estimates of Clearwire
[sic] value using traditional DCF methodologies, including Clearwire's Single Customer Case
(Clearwire has stated that its Multi Customer Case does not appear viable) provide values well
below Sprint's initial offer to Clearwire."
• "Given Sprint's current network deployment plan, a successful Dish tender could create
substantial [*43] 'hold up' value. Dish's potential ability to block Sprint's current plans could
create a negative impact on Sprint that exceeds Clearwire's value, while also destroying value for
Sprint."128
Schwartz did not present the financial models he developed. Sprint's board agreed to authorize an
increase in the merger consideration to $5.00 per share without seeing the Full Build Projections.

V. The Final Merger Consideration
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Also on June 17, 2013, Sprint sued DISH and Clearwire in this court, alleging that DISH's tender
offer violated Sprint's contractual rights under the Equityholders' Agreement and Delaware law.
On June 18, DISH rescinded its proposed merger with Sprint and announced that it would
instead "focus [its] efforts and resources on completing the Clearwire tender offer."129
On June 19, 2013, Fisher spoke with representatives of the Gang of Four. They agreed to support
the Clearwire-Sprint Merger at $5.00 per share.130 Fisher relayed the news to Son, telling him:
"This is a higher price than what I would have liked but we eventually agreed to settle on this as
a price that neither of us are happy with, but gets the deal done." Fisher added that he and Sprint
"have also spoked to Intel and [*44] Comcast and have their support . . . Together with the
shareholders that have already voted in favor, this should get us to over 50%.131
On June 19, 2013, Sprint provided Clearwire with a revised merger agreement that increased the
merger consideration to $5.00 per share. In return, Sprint required that Clearwire "terminate all
discussions with [DISH]" and issue a press release stating that the Special Committee and the
Board had reinstated their recommendation in favor of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger and against
the DISH tender offer.132
On June 19, 2013, the Special Committee considered the revised merger agreement. The Special
Committee members acknowledged that the revised merger agreement would preclude further
negotiations with DISH but concluded that "the benefits of locking in the $5.00 per share
proposal from Sprint . . . outweighed the possibility that DISH might increase its offer . . . ."133
The Special Committee also noted that Sprint's lawsuit against DISH "gives rise to greater
uncertainty regarding the closing of the DISH Offer."134
On June 20, 2013, the Special Committee voted unanimously to recommend Sprint's offer to the
Board. The Board adopted the Special Committee's recommendation [*45] later that day.135
Sprint and Clearwire subsequently entered into an amended merger agreement that increased the
merger consideration to $5.00 per share.
During a special meeting of stockholders held July 8, 2013, the holders of approximately 82% of
Clearwire's unaffiliated shares voted in favor of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. On July 9, the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger closed. On July 10, the Sprint-Softbank Transaction closed.

II. THE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM
Aurelius sought to prove that the Clearwire-Sprint Merger resulted from breaches of fiduciary
duty by Sprint, aided and abetted by Softbank. Aurelius also pursued a statutory appraisal of its
shares. The Delaware Supreme Court has instructed that when a litigant asserts both types of
claims, the Court of Chancery should address the breach of fiduciary duty claims first, because a
finding of liability and the resultant remedy could moot the appraisal proceeding.136

A. The Standard Of Review
HN1 To determine whether a corporate fiduciary has breached its duties, a court examines the
fiduciary's conduct through the lens of a standard of review.137 "When a transaction involving
self-dealing by a controlling shareholder is challenged, the applicable [*46] standard of judicial
review is entire fairness, with the defendants having the burden of persuasion."138
In an effort to avoid fiduciary review entirely, Sprint argues that it was not a controlling
stockholder and therefore did not owe fiduciary duties to Clearwire and its minority
stockholders. Sprint owned a majority of Clearwire's equity, which traditionally sufficed to
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confer controlling stockholder status and concomitant fiduciary duties.139 Sprint, however,
disputes this proposition and asserts that even a majority stockholder must exercise actual or
effective control over the corporation's board of directors before it can be deemed a controller
and a fiduciary. Building on this premise, Sprint argues that the governance provisions in the
Equityholders' Agreement prevented Sprint from exercising effective control over Clearwire and
prevented Sprint from owing fiduciary duties. Given the outcome of the case, I need not reach
this argument. Assuming [*47] that Sprint was Clearwire's controlling stockholder, Sprint did
not breach its fiduciary duties.
In an effort to ameliorate the burden it would bear under the entire fairness standard, Sprint
argues that either the involvement of the Special Committee or the requirement of a majority-ofthe-minority vote resulted in Aurelius bearing the burden at trial to prove that the ClearwireSprint Merger was unfair. HN3 The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when entire
fairness applies, the defendant fiduciaries bear the burden of proving fairness unless they seek
and obtain a pretrial determination that the burden should be allocated differently.140 In this
case, the defendants moved for summary judgment on this issue, but the record did not permit a
pretrial determination that the defendants were entitled to a burden shift.141 The burden of
proof therefore remained with Sprint "throughout the trial to demonstrate the entire fairness of
the interested transaction."142
In an effort to limit the extent of the conduct that is subject to review under the entire fairness
test, Sprint argues that its actions should be evaluated separately and in isolation from
Softbank's, such that none of Softbank's [*48] activities can attributed to Sprint. Contrary to
Sprint's position, there are a range of fact-specific circumstances in which the conduct of one
actor can be attributed to another for purposes of imposing liability.143 This decision does not
require detailed analysis on this point because even if all of Softbank's conduct is attributed to
Sprint and viewed in the aggregate, Sprint did not breach its fiduciary duties.

B. Evaluating Fairness
As noted, HN4 when a stockholder plaintiff challenges a transaction between a corporation and
its controlling stockholder, the governing standard of review is entire fairness. "Fairness does not
depend on the parties' subjective beliefs."144 Once entire fairness applies, the defendants must
establish "to the court's satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and
fair price."145
"The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price."146 Although the
two aspects may be examined in turn, they are not separate elements of a two-part test. "[T]he
test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of the issue
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of [*49] entire fairness."147
HN5 The fair dealing aspect of the unitary entire fairness standard "embraces questions of
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained."148 As
with the overarching issue of fairness, the various dimensions of fair dealing can elide, such that
a particular instance of unfair dealing undermines multiple aspects of the process. This is often
the case when a controller engages in an act of unfair dealing that it subsequently fails to
disclose. In those situations, the act both provides evidence of unfairness in its own right and
gives rise to an additional instance of unfairness in the form of a disclosure violation.149
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HN6 The fair price aspect of the entire fairness test "relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value,
earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a
company's stock."150 The economic inquiry called for by the fair price aspect is the same as
the fair value standard under the appraisal statute. [*50] 151 The two standards differ, however,
in that the appraisal statute requires that the court determine a point estimate for fair value
measured in dollars and cents.152 The fair price aspect of the entire fairness test, by contrast, is
not in itself a remedial calculation. The entire fairness test is a standard of review that is applied
to identify a fiduciary breach.153 "For purposes of determining fairness, as opposed to crafting
a remedy, the court's task is not to pick a single number, but to determine whether the transaction
price falls within a range of fairness."154
HN7 When evaluating the question of fiduciary breach, the court considers whether "a
reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances, would regard [the transaction] as within a range
of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept."155 This [*51] standard
recognizes the reality that "[t]he value of a corporation is not a point on a line, but a range of
reasonable values. . . ."156 Applying this standard, a court could conclude that a price fell
within a range of fairness that would not support fiduciary liability, and yet the point calculation
demanded by the appraisal statute could yield an award in excess of the merger price.157
HN8 Consistent with the unitary nature of the entire fairness test, the fair process and fair price
aspects interact. The range of fairness has most salience when the controller has established a
process that simulates arm's-length bargaining, supported by appropriate procedural
protections.158 A strong record of fair dealing can influence the fair price inquiry and lead to a
conclusion that the price was fair. But the range of fairness is not a safe-harbor that permits
controllers to extract barely fair transactions. Factors such as coercion, the misuse of confidential
information, secret conflicts, or fraud could lead a court to hold that a transaction that fell within
the range of fairness was nevertheless [*52] unfair compared to what faithful fiduciaries could
have achieved. Under those circumstances, the appropriate remedy can be a "fairer" price159 or
an award of rescissory damages.160 Just as a fair process can support the price, an unfair
process can taint the price.161
Broadly framed, the deal process in this case had two phases. The first phase encompassed Sprint
and Softbank's overtures to Clearwire, the negotiation of the original merger agreement, and
Sprint and Softbank's efforts to obtain stockholder approval at the original price of $2.97 per
share. When stockholder approval was not achieved and DISH intervened, the deal process
entered a second phase that resulted in the final merger consideration of $5.00 per share.
Aurelius has identified multiple instances of unfair dealing that took place during the first phase.
Aurelius has not identified any meaningful instances of unfair dealing during the second phase.
If Sprint and Softbank had succeeded in obtaining stockholder approval of the Clearwire-Sprint
Merger at the original price of $2.97 per share, then their acts of unfair dealing would have
resulted in a finding [*53] of unfairness and a damages award in the form of a fairer price. But
DISH's intervention changed the landscape so substantially as to render immaterial the instances
of unfair dealing that took place during the first phase. The final merger consideration of $5.00
per share was a price that a seller, under all of the circumstances, could reasonably accept.
Approximately 70% of the non-Sprint stockholders, including the Gang of Four and excluding
Intel, accepted that price. Despite Sprint and Softbank's unfair dealing during the first phase, the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger was entirely fair.
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1. Transaction Initiation
HN9 "Fair dealing encompasses an evaluation of how the transaction was initiated."162 "The
scope of this factor is not limited to the controller's formal act of making the proposal; it
encompasses actions taken by the controller in the period leading up to the formal proposal."163
Aurelius identifies two issues during this period: (i) Sprint and Softbank's obstruction of a
business opportunity with Qualcomm and (ii) Sprint's early discussions about price with Stanton.

a. The Qualcomm Opportunity
Aurelius claims that Sprint dealt unfairly with Clearwire by interfering with a business
opportunity [*54] to sell spectrum to Qualcomm. Aurelius contends that Sprint sought to
weaken Clearwire so that Clearwire would be in a compromised bargaining position when
negotiating the merger. Although the parties have not cited a Delaware case that deals with
similar conduct, HN10 Delaware decisions have recognized that "[a] calculated effort to
depress the [market] price" of a stock "until the minority stockholders are eliminated by merger
or some other form of acquisition" constitutes unfair dealing.164 By parity of reasoning,
depriving the controlled company of business opportunities in a calculated effort to depress its
value also constitutes unfair dealing.
In October 2012, Sprint and Softbank were planning their acquisition of Clearwire but had not
yet approached the Company. Hesse and Son learned that Clearwire was exploring a sale of
spectrum to Qualcomm that would raise much needed cash. To interfere with that transaction,
Hesse and Son called Qualcomm and warned that "Sprint would have to approve any sale of
Clearwire spectrum."165 Stanton described the call as an effort by Sprint and Softbank to "cut
[Clearwire] off from [its] alternatives," and he complained that Hesse and Son's
interference [*55] "damaged [Clearwire's] credibility with Qualcomm and made it more difficult
for us to do a transaction with them."166 The factual record supports Stanton's assessment.
If the final deal price had remained at $2.97 per share, then the Qualcomm incident would have
provided some evidence of unfairness. Sprint and Softbank tried to harm Clearwire by interfering
with one of its alternatives, and the additional resources from a successful sale of spectrum could
have helped the Special Committee bargain with Sprint. But the causal connection is tangential,
and the extent of the effect unclear. Moreover, the incident lost its relevance once Clearwire's
stockholders rejected the merger at $2.97 per share, DISH intervened, and Sprint increased the
merger consideration to $5.00 per share. At most, the Qualcomm incident might have prevented
the Special Committee from obtaining a price marginally greater than $2.97 per share. The price
of $5.00 per share that Clearwire's stockholders received was far beyond anything the Special
Committee could have extracted without DISH's intervention, even if the Qualcomm incident
had not happened.

b. The Early Discussions With Stanton
Aurelius also claims that [*56] Sprint dealt unfairly with Clearwire by engaging in early
discussions with Stanton in an effort to cap what Sprint would have to pay. Aurelius focuses on a
meeting on October 8, 2012, when Stanton signaled that the Clearwire Board would support a
merger at $2.00 per share, and a meeting on November 2, 2012, when Stanton told Sprint and
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Softbank that he could "deliver the shareholders" at $2.97 per share. Aurelius observes that these
discussions took place without authorization from the Clearwire Board and before the Special
Committee was formed.
The record as a whole shows that during this period, Stanton was trying to elicit an offer from
Sprint. Stanton was concerned about Clearwire's prospects and believed a merger with Sprint
was Clearwire's best alternative. When Stanton discussed a figure of $2.00 per share in October
2012, Clearwire's stock was trading around $1.30 per share. After news of the Sprint-Softbank
transaction leaked on October 11, Clearwire's stock jumped to $2.22 per share. During a call
after the news leaked, Stanton told Hesse that Sprint should make a "fair offer."167
Meanwhile, Eagle River used the unique bargaining leverage it possessed because of its
governance [*57] rights to extract $2.97 per share. During the meeting on November 2, 2012,
Stanton tried to obtain the highest price possible for Clearwire's public stockholders. The public
minority lacked the same leverage as Eagle River, but Stanton saw an opportunity to get the
same price for the public shares. He therefore told Son that Clearwire's stockholders would not
support a transaction at less than $2.97 per share. While it is true that Stanton also said that he
could "deliver the stockholders" at $2.97 per share, that was puffery and intended to induce
Softbank to offer that price. I do not believe that Stanton was committing to support that price,
only saying that this was the minimum price that could get a deal done because of the precedent
of the Eagle River transaction.
Son heard Stanton as making "a commitment . . . to do [a] deal at $2.97,"168 but that was a
miscommunication. Stanton could not legally bind the Clearwire Board, nor could he deliver
votes from stockholders whom he did not control. Son may have misunderstood because of
language difficulties (Son speaks fluent English, but it is not his first language) or due to
different cultural expectations (as the CEO-controller of a [*58] Japanese corporation, Son
might have made the type of commitment that he thought Stanton made). Regardless of its
source, the miscommunication affected the negotiations. When the Special Committee later
sought $3.15 per share, Son flatly refused "as a matter of principle."169
As with the Qualcomm incident, if the final deal price had remained at $2.97 per share, then
Stanton's early discussions might have provided some evidence of unfairness. Stanton did get out
in front of the Clearwire Board, and he did limit the Special Committee's freedom to negotiate.
Standing alone, Stanton's communications would not have supported a finding of unfairness, but
they would have been part of the overall mix. Under no circumstances would Stanton's
communications have resulted in liability for him, because I am convinced that when
negotiating, he acted in a good faith effort to pursue the best interests of Clearwire and its
stockholders.170 He may have erred, but not disloyally or in bad faith.
Regardless, Stanton's early communications with Sprint made little difference after Clearwire's
stockholders rejected the merger at $2.97 per share and DISH intervened. Competition from
DISH drove Sprint to offer [*59] $5.00 per share. At most, Stanton's comments might have
prevented the Special Committee from obtaining a price marginally greater than $2.97 per share.
The price of $5.00 per share that Clearwire's stockholders received was far beyond anything the
Special Committee could have extracted without DISH's intervention, even if Stanton had never
had his early meetings with Sprint and Softbank.

2. Transaction Negotiation
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HN11 "Fair dealing encompasses questions of how the transaction is negotiated and
structured."171 The record establishes that the Special Committee was independent and
bargained at arm's-length. Aurelius attacks the negotiations by arguing that Sprint deprived the
Special Committee of material information by failing to disclose its projections for its use of
Clearwire's spectrum.
HN12 "[A]n important element of an effective special committee is that it be fully informed in
making its determination."172 As Chancellor Allen explained, "in order to make a special
committee structure work it is necessary that a controlling shareholder disclose fully all the
material facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction."173 Although the underlying
disclosure obligation derives from trust law and the duty [*60] of loyalty that a fiduciary owes
its beneficiary,174 modern applications focus on the goal of replicating arm's-length
negotiations.175 Seen in this light, the controller's duty of disclosure stops at the point when
forcing disclosure would undermine the potential for arm's-length negotiations to take place.
Consequently, "there are some categories of information that while possibly material to the
decision must [not be disclosed] in order for a negotiation to occur at all. The clearest example
would involve information disclosing the top price that a proposed buyer would be willing or
able to pay. . . ."176 A controller similarly is not required to disclose private information that
reveals how a controller values the company and hence what the controller is willing to pay.177
When the negotiations between Sprint and the Special Committee were taking place, Sprint
possessed two set of internal projections. Both forecasted greater demand for Clearwire's
spectrum than Clearwire's internal projections. Sprint did not provide its projections to the
Special Committee, which only had the Single Customer Case and the Multi Customer Case.
Aurelius [*61] claims that Sprint had to disclose its projections to the Special Committee, but
that is incorrect. The projections constituted private information that would have revealed how
Sprint valued Clearwire and hence how much Sprint was willing to pay. Because Sprint was
Clearwire's only significant customer, Clearwire's value largely depended on how much demand
Sprint had for Clearwire's spectrum. Armed with Sprint's projections, the Special Committee
could have run a discounted cash flow analysis to determine Sprint's reserve price. Consequently,
Sprint did not have a duty to disclose them. Notably, the Special Committee and its advisors did
not expect to receive Sprint's long-term projections and did not ask for them.178 Under the
circumstances, Sprint had no duty to give Clearwire its projections, and its failure to provide
them is not evidence of unfair dealing.

3. Stockholder Approval
HN13 Fair dealing encompasses questions of "how the approvals of . . . the stockholders were
obtained."179 Aurelius has identified multiple instances of unfair dealing by Sprint and
Softbank in connection with the vote on the Clearwire-Sprint Merger at the original price of
$2.97 per share. Their activities were [*62] sufficiently extensive, intentional, and manipulative
that if the stockholders had approved the merger at the original price of $2.97 per share, the vote
could not have been given any legitimacy. But the problem for Aurelius is that despite Sprint and
Softbank's machinations, the stockholders refused to approve the merger at $2.97 per share.
DISH then intervened and started a bidding war. The competition from DISH resulted in a price
beyond anything the Special Committee or the stockholders could have achieved on their own,
even without Sprint and Softbank's interventions.
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a. Stockholder Approval at $2.97 Per Share
Aurelius proved that Sprint and Softbank jointly engaged in multiple acts of unfair dealing in an
effort to obtain stockholder approval for the Clearwire-Sprint Merger at $2.97 per share. This
decision could spend many pages discussing the nuances of each and their legal implications, but
because they did not ultimately undermine the fairness of the merger, that discussion would be
gratuitous. In brief, the incidents were as follows:
• SoftBank bought Intel's vote in support of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. The record establishes
that Son secured Intel's support for the merger [*63] by promising Intel a broader commercial
relationship, including a partnership on a new cellular handset.180 Intel's CEO wrote bluntly
that Intel "agreed to sell [its Clearwire] shares contingent on a broader business deal."181 Vote
buying ordinarily is analyzed as an independent wrong.182 In this instance, it was part of
Sprint and Softbank's unfair dealing.
• Sprint and Softbank failed to disclose the side deal with Intel. The proxy statement omitted any
mention of Softbank's commitment to Intel. Instead, Sprint stressed Intel's support for the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger as evidence that "Sprint's $2.97 per share offer provides full value to
Clearwire's stockholders."183 This disclosure implied that Intel supported the merger solely
because Intel believed that the price was fair, rather than because Intel also thought it was getting
a broader commercial relationship. The proxy statement should have contained a complete
description of Intel's reasons for supporting the merger.184
• Sprint and Softbank blocked another potential spectrum sale. In a reprise of the Qualcomm
incident, Sprint and Softbank shut down inquiries from Google that could have [*64] developed
into an opportunity for Clearwire to raise money by selling spectrum.185 Google initially
reached out to Sprint in December 2012, and Sprint convinced Google to wait until after Sprint
and Softbank acquired Clearwire.186 After Sprint and Clearwire signed their merger
agreement, Google then reached out to Softbank's financial advisor in January 2013. Softbank
did not want a deal with Google announced in advance of the stockholder vote, so Softbank's
financial advisor tried to put Google off.187 Eventually, Google stated that without a response,
it would reach out directly to Son, Sprint, or Clearwire.188 The next day, Fisher told Son that
he needed to meet with Google "to avoid them going directly to Clearwire."189 A meeting was
arranged. Google never approached Clearwire. No one informed Clearwire about Google's
interest.190
• Sprint and Softbank allowed the proxy statement to contain an incorrect disclosure about
potential spectrum sales. The interference with Google's interest in purchasing spectrum resulted
in a disclosure violation. Although Softbank and Sprint knew about the Google contact, they
failed to make the Clearwire directors aware of it. As a result, Clearwire disclosed [*65] in the
proxy statement that "management of Clearwire and [Stanton] solicited what they believed to be
all reasonably available potential buyers of spectrum assets of Clearwire, and . . . each potential
buyer that was solicited affirmatively declined any interest in acquiring spectrum, except . . .
DISH."191 This was incorrect. Google was one of the buyers that Clearwire solicited. Google
had interest in Clearwire's spectrum, but Sprint and Softbank had convinced Google to wait until
after the Clearwire-Sprint Merger closed.192 Sprint and Softbank knew that this statement was
not true and should have informed the Special Committee or clarified the statement in their own
communications to Clearwire's stockholders.193
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• Sprint and Softbank refused to document the Accelerated Build. Before the merger agreement
was signed, Sprint and Softbank told Stanton that they wanted Clearwire to build 12,500 new
sites by the end of 2013, that Sprint would pay for those sites, and that Sprint would make
revenue commitments "to cover the continuing costs of long term operation of those sites in the
event the [Clearwire-Sprint Merger] did not close, for any reason."194 Once the merger
agreement was executed, [*66] Stanton sought to pin down the details in a commercial
agreement. He did not believe that Sprint could pay for the Accelerated Build itself, and he was
concerned about the possibility that Sprint and Softbank might renege if the Softbank
Transaction did not close.195 Fisher vetoed the idea, telling Softbank's chief technology
officer, "Softbank can not have a direct agreement with Clearwire before the Clearwire
shareholder vote takes place — this could encourage dissident shareholders to vote against the
acquisition because it could make Clearwire look stronger as an independent company."196 On
February 14, 2013, Sprint and Softbank ended discussions on the Accelerated Build. Hesse told
Stanton that Son had been "persuaded that he needn't rush to provide coverage . . . and that a
more deliberate approach will produce better long-term results."197 Stanton told Fisher that
Sprint and Softbank were acting in "bad faith" and were "not living up to their agreement."198
• Softbank and Sprint made retributive threats. Sprint repeatedly told Clearwire's minority
stockholders that if the Clearwire-Sprint Merger failed, Sprint would take full control of the
Clearwire Board, finance Clearwire in a manner [*67] that would result in "substantial
dilution"199 to Clearwire's existing stockholders, and engage in a squeeze-out merger without
a stockholder vote after the standstill provision of the Equityholders' Agreement expired in
November 2013.200 During the roadshow for the Sprint-Softbank Transaction, Son made
similar threats.201
• Sprint insisted on a dilutive conversion price in the Note Purchase Agreement. When Clearwire
sought interim financing in the form of convertible debt, Sprint insisted on a conversion price of
$1.50 per share. The low conversion price threated stockholders with dilution and had a coercive
effect.202 Clearwire's CFO summarized the situation by stating that "Sprint designed the [Note
Purchase Agreement] this way so that it is dilutive in the event that the deal does not close to
incent common to vote for the deal."203
If Clearwire's stockholders had approved the original merger at $2.97 per share, then this array of
misconduct would have resulted in a finding of unfair dealing and a damages award in the form
of a fairer price. Sprint and Softbank's misconduct proved ineffective, however, because enough
of Clearwire's stockholders opposed the merger at $2.97 per share to prevent [*68] Sprint from
obtaining a favorable vote.
After DISH intervened and the merger consideration was raised to $5.00 per share, the relevance,
materiality, and effectiveness of Sprint and Softbank's misconduct faded.
• Intel's vote had no effect on the outcome. Excluding Intel, approximately 70% of Clearwire's
minority stockholders approved the merger at $5.00 per share. The effect of the vote-buying also
was mitigated, because Intel's reasons for favoring a vote at $2.97 per share had less pertinence
once the consideration reached $5.00 per share.
• A potential Google transaction could not have led to value approaching $5.00 per share. If the
stockholders had known about Google's interest, it would have reinforced their willingness to
turn down the merger, but they proved willing to do that regardless. If the Special Committee
had known about Google's interest, it might have enabled them to bargain for a transaction above
$2.97 per share, but it could not have led to the realization of value exceeding the final merger
consideration of $5.00 per share. Indeed, it is not even clear that Google would have engaged in
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a transaction with Clearwire at all. When Clearwire independently contacted Google [*69] in
December 2012, Google declined to explore a transaction with Clearwire because Google saw
Sprint and Softbank as better strategic partners.204
• The Accelerated Build could not have led to value approaching $5.00 per share. There is no
credible basis to think that the value of Clearwire with the Accelerated Build would have
exceeded $5.00 per share. Indeed, the value of Clearwire with the Accelerated Build remains
highly speculative, because there were major deal points that remained open when Softbank and
Sprint postponed the discussions indefinitely. Additionally, Clearwire's definitive proxy
statement disclosed Sprint and Softbank's proposal of the Accelerated Build during negotiations
and the parties subsequent efforts to reach an agreement.205 That Clearwire's stockholders
nonetheless approved the merger at $5.00 per share suggests that Sprint's offer captured the value
from the proposed Accelerated Build.
• Sprint and Softbank's coercion proved ineffective. Both the dilutive structure of the Note
Purchase Agreement and Sprint and Softbank's retributive threats were attempts at coercion. It is
possible that they had some continuing effect after DISH intervened and
influenced [*70] Clearwire's minority stockholders to approve the merger at the final price of
$5.00 per share, but it seems unlikely. If anything, Sprint and Softbank's heavy-handed tactics
appear to have had the opposite effect of galvanizing stockholder opposition. In my view, once
the price reached $5.00 per share, it was sufficiently generous that the fair price aspect of the
entire fairness inquiry predominates over any lingering coercion.206
In a hypothetical world in which the Clearwire-Sprint Merger closed at $2.97 per share, Sprint
and Softbank's interference with the stockholder vote on the Clearwire-Sprint Merger would
have warranted a finding of unfairness and an award of a fairer price. Under those circumstances,
the resulting award would not have approached $5.00 per share. It likely would have anchored
off of the Special Committee's consistent demand of $3.15 per share, thereby giving credit to the
contemporaneous judgment of Clearwire's informed, independent fiduciaries. The award also
likely would have attempted to remedy in some way the dilution from the Note Purchase
Agreement by adjusting the conversion price. At $5.00 per share, the consideration
received [*71] by the minority stockholders exceeded anything this court would have awarded
as a remedy for unfair dealing.

b. Stockholder Approval at $5.00 Per Share
Stockholder approval of the transaction eventually took place in July of 2013, after DISH's
tender offer. Aurelius complains that Sprint required Clearwire to "terminate all discussions with
[DISH]" as a condition for increasing its offer to $5.00 per share.207 Aurelius claims that this
demand cut short a potential bidding war between DISH and Sprint that might have yielded a
higher price for Clearwire.
Sprint and Softbank did not force the Special Committee to agree to terminate discussions with
DISH. The Special Committee concluded that "the benefits of locking in the $5.00 per share
proposal from Sprint . . . outweighed the possibility that DISH might increase its offer."208
Their decision was entirely fair. When DISH raised its price, it demanded the right to appoint
directors and veto transactions between Clearwire and Sprint. Sprint immediately sued DISH and
Clearwire over those demands. The Special Committee believed that any rights it might try to
grant would be unenforceable. Chief Justice Strine, who presided over Sprint's
lawsuit [*72] while serving as a Chancellor, validated the Special Committee's belief. When
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hearing Sprint's motion to expedite, then-Chancellor Strine commented that Sprint's claims
against DISH and Clearwire had "vibrant, vibrant color."209 Although DISH had agreed to
bear the costs of litigation, the Special Committee was concerned that accepting DISH's tender
offer "would result in years of litigation" for Clearwire.210
The Special Committee's decision to accept Sprint's offer also did not preclude DISH from
topping Sprint's bid unilaterally, as it had done twice before. Contrary to Aurelius's claim, the
bidding could have continued. That DISH chose not to bid further suggests that it was not willing
to top Sprint's offer of $5.00 per share. The Special Committee's decision to accept $5.00 per
share and not go back to DISH is not evidence of unfair dealing.

4. The Fairness Of The Price
HN16 The fair price aspect can be "the predominant consideration in the unitary entire fairness
inquiry."211 There is ample evidence indicating that that the original deal price of $2.97 per
share was fair to Clearwire and its minority stockholders. There is overwhelming evidence that
the final deal price of $5.00 per share was fair to Clearwire and [*73] its minority stockholders.
Many factors support the fairness of the original deal price of $2.97 per share. It was the product
of arm's-length bargaining by Stanton and the Special Committee.212 Aurelius has not been
challenged their independence, and "the record indicates that [they] took their responsibilities
seriously."213
That major Clearwire stockholders agreed to sell their stock at $2.97 per share also supports the
fairness of the price.214 After the announcement of the Sprint-Softbank Transaction, Eagle
River sold its Clearwire stock to Sprint for $2.97 per share. Under the Equityholders' Agreement,
the other Strategic Investors had a right to purchase Eagle River's shares at that price. None did.
The Strategic Investors subsequently agreed to support the Clearwire-Sprint Merger at the same
price of $2.97 per share and committed to sell their shares to Sprint at that price if Clearwire's
stockholders did not approve the merger. All of the Strategic Investors were sophisticated parties
with deep knowledge of Clearwire's business and the wireless industry. Other than Intel, all of
the Strategic Investors agreed to sell at $2.97 per share solely because they believed that price
was [*74] a good one.
Market indications also supports the fairness of the $2.97 per share price. In December 2012,
after news leaked about the Sprint-Softbank Transaction but before any media reports of
Clearwire and Sprint's negotiations, Clearwire's stock traded at around $2.40 per share.215 In
December 2012, the majority of outside analysts had set target prices for Clearwire at or below
$3.00 per share.216 Sprint's bid implicitly valued Clearwire's spectrum at $.21 per MHzpop,217 a figure which is consistent with offers for spectrum from DISH and other parties
during this period.218
There is also the evidence from the experts' opinions at trial. As discussed in the next section,
this decision finds persuasive Professor Bradford Cornell's valuation of Clearwire, which
determined that Clearwire had a fair value of $2.13 per share. The initial merger consideration of
$2.97 per share is fair when judged against this price and is consistent with the Special
Committee having successfully extracted a portion of the synergies that Sprint hoped to achieve.
All of the evidence indicating that $2.97 per share was fair is all the more convincing for the
final merger consideration of $5.00 per share. [*75] Stanton and the Committee never
contemplated, much less proposed, anything close to $5.00 per share.219 In December 2012,
most market analysts valued Clearwire at far less than $5.00 per share.220 In May 2013, large
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Clearwire stockholders told Sprint and Softbank that they believed that "Clearwire was worth $45."221
There is also no evidence that anyone at Sprint or Softbank believed that Clearwire was worth
$5.00 per share.222 Rather, they agreed to pay that price because of the massive synergies from
the transaction and the threat that DISH posed as a hostile minority investor.223 Even with
these considerations in mind, Softbank only agreed to pay $5.00 per share with great reluctance,
and Son adamantly refused to pay any more.224
The $5.00 per share also carries the imprimatur of Clearwire's minority stockholders.225
Excluding Intel's votes, approximately 70% of Clearwire's minority stockholders approved the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger. This included the Gang of Four, some of Clearwire's most vocal
dissident stockholders. Particularly considering their contentious opposition to the merger at
lower prices, approval of the merger at $5.00 per share by a supermajority of Clearwire's
minority [*76] stockholders is compelling evidence that the price was fair.

5. The Unitary Determination Of Fairness
HN21 The unitary entire fairness standard requires a singular determination of fairness. "This
judgment concerning 'fairness' will inevitably constitute a judicial judgment that in some respects
is reflective of subjective reactions to the facts of a case."226 "The concept of fairness is of
course not a technical concept. No litmus paper can be found or [G]eiger-counter invented that
will make determinations of fairness objective."227
In my view, the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was entirely fair to Clearwire's minority stockholders.
Sprint and Softbank engaged in unfair dealing early in the process and when seeking to achieve
stockholder approval at $2.97 per share. The stockholders' refusal to take that price, and DISH's
intervention in the sale process, freshened the atmosphere and created a competitive dynamic.
The resulting competition between DISH and Sprint led to the $5.00 per share merger
consideration, independent of the earlier acts of unfair dealing by Sprint and Softbank.
HN22 "[P]erfection is not possible, or expected as a condition precedent to a judicial
determination of entire fairness."228 The Delaware Supreme [*77] Court has characterized the
proper "test of fairness" as whether "the minority stockholder shall receive the substantial
equivalent in value of what he had before."229 Through the Clearwire-Sprint Merger,
Clearwire's stockholders received substantially more in value than what they had before. The
outcome had blemishes, even flaws, but it was entirely fair.

C. Aiding and Abetting Claim Against Softbank
Aurelius alleges that Softbank aided and abetted Sprint's breach of fiduciary duty. HN23 A
claim for aiding and abetting requires an underlying breach of fiduciary duty.230 Because the
Clearwire-Sprint Merger satisfied the test of entire fairness, Sprint did not breach its fiduciary
duties to Clearwire or its minority stockholders. Softbank therefore cannot be liable for aiding
and abetting.

III. THE APPRAISAL CLAIM
HN24 "An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended to provide
shareholders dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a
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judicial determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings."231 Delaware's
appraisal statute requires that the court "determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value [*78] arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation . . . ."232 When determining fair value, the statute instructs the court to "take into
account all relevant factors."233 "In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery
has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general framework or to fashion
its own."234 It is "entirely proper for the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's model,
methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation is supported by credible
evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis on the record."235
HN25 "The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is entitled
to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern."236 When applying this standard, the corporation "must be valued as a going concern
based upon the operative reality of the company as of the time of the merger," taking into
account its particular market position in light of future prospects.237 A determination of fair
value assesses "the value of the company . . . as a going concern, rather than its value to a third
party as an acquisition." [*79] 238 Consequently, the "appraisal statute requires that the Court
exclude any synergies present in the deal price—that is, value arising solely from the deal."239

A. The Merger Price
HN26 The consideration that the buyer agrees to provide in the deal and that the seller agrees
to accept is one form of market price data, which Delaware courts have long considered in
appraisal proceedings.240 Unlike in many cases, the respondent has not argued that the court
should give weight to the deal price. This is unsurprising, because the Clearwire-Sprint Merger
involved a controlling stockholder.241 Although the merger ultimately satisfied entire fairness,
the deal process was far from perfect.
The deal price also provided an exaggerated picture of Clearwire's value because the transaction
generated considerable synergies. In June 2013, Sprint estimated that the merger yielded
synergies ranging from $1.5 to $2 billion, or $1.95 to 2.60 per share.242 Other synergy
estimates were higher still.243 If the court relied on Clearwire's deal price, it would have to
determine the value of those synergies and back them out.244
Because no one argued in favor of the deal price, and because the record contains other reliable
evidence of fair value, this decision does not consider the deal price.

B. Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
HN27 A discounted cash flow ("DCF") analysis is an established method of determining the
going concern value of a corporation.245 Both Sprint and Aurelius relied on DCF analyses to
determine Clearwire's fair value. The petitioners' expert, Professor Gregg Jarrell, found that
Clearwire had a fair value of $16.08 per share. The respondent's expert, Professor Bradford
Cornell, found that Clearwire had a fair value of $2.13 per share.

1. The Projections
HN28 "The first key to a reliable DCF analysis is the availability of reliable projections of
future expected cash flows, preferably derived from contemporaneous management projections
36

prepared in the ordinary course of business."246 "Delaware law clearly prefers valuations
based on contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily
has the best first-hand knowledge of the company's operations."247 "When management
projections are made in the ordinary course of business, they are generally deemed reliable."248
This court [*81] has rejected projections that were not prepared in the ordinary course of
business and which showed the influence of the transactional dynamics in which they were
created.249
In this case, the experts' choice of projections drove 90% of the difference in their DCF
valuations.250 Jarrell used the Full Build Projections. Cornell used the Single Customer Case.
For the reasons explained below, the Full Build Projections did not reflect Clearwire's operative
reality in the event that the Clearwire-Sprint Merger did not close. The Single Customer Case,
prepared by Clearwire's management in the ordinary course of business, reflected Clearwire's
operative reality on the date of the merger.

a. The Full Build Projections
The Full Build Projections were created by Sprint's management team, not Clearwire's. The Full
Build Projections also were not created in the ordinary course of business. Sprint management
created them to convince Softbank to top DISH's tender offer by showing what it would look like
to attempt the same business plan without owning Clearwire. To build the projections, Sprint's
corporate development team took models premised on an acquisition of Clearwire, then
posited [*82] that Sprint would make all the same business decisions if it had pay wholesale
prices to Clearwire.251 The resulting model was not a plausible business plan.
First, the Full Build Projections assumed that Sprint would use the same quantity of Clearwire's
spectrum, paying by the gigabyte, as Sprint would if it owned the spectrum itself. The evidence
at trial showed that Sprint in fact would use less spectrum because paying Clearwire for
spectrum had a much higher marginal cost.252 Under the Full Build Projections, spectrum
would cost Sprint an average of $3.30 per gigabyte, compared to less than a dollar if Sprint
owned the spectrum.253 It is implausible that Sprint's demand for spectrum would not decrease
in response to this large price increase.254
Second, the Full Build Projections assumed that Sprint could extract major price concessions
from Clearwire. The Full Build Projections anticipated that Clearwire would accept $2-3 per
gigabyte in cost of service payments from Sprint, compared to the $5-6 per gigabyte under the
Wholesale Agreement. The Full Build Projections did not explain why Clearwire would cut its
prices by 50%. In fact, Clearwire had strongly resisted Sprint's push for [*83] a rate reduction
during the negotiations over the Wholesale Agreement. The Full Build Projections also assumed
that Sprint could "achieve [the] same build on [the] same timeline" without "accounting for
friction arising from working with Clearwire."255 There was likely to be substantial friction, as
illustrated by the contentious negotiations over the Accelerated Build.256
Third, the Full Build Projections had financial holes. They assumed that Sprint would borrow $5
billion at market rates, give the money to Clearwire to build its network, and never get the
money back.257 They also assumed that Clearwire could refinance $4.3 billion in debt
"without support from Sprint," which was implausible given Clearwire's financial condition in a
scenario where the merger did not close.258
Finally, the Full Build Projections assumed that Sprint would pay Clearwire a staggering amount
of money. The Full Build Projections forecasted that Sprint would pay Clearwire $20.8 billion in
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cost of service payments from 2014 to 2018. These payments would decrease Sprint's
OIBDA259 by as much as $12.5 billion.260 Although Sprint and Softbank technically could
have afforded to pursue this value-destructive [*84] plan, it is unlikely that they would have
done so. They would have found other, less expensive and more profitable options.
Aurelius contended that Sprint and Softbank had no other options and had to pursue the Full
Build if the Clearwire-Sprint Merger did not close. Aurelius pointed to growing customer
demand for wireless data and Sprint's lack of access to other sources of spectrum. But the
Limited Build demonstrates that Sprint had other options. Like the Full Build, the Limited Build
included some herculean assumptions,261 but it was a starting point for a network plan that did
not use as much of Clearwire's spectrum.262 At the very least, something like the Limited
Build offered a "temporary solution" for Sprint and Softbank while they assessed their
options.263
A temporary solution was all that Sprint and Softbank required. If the Clearwire-Sprint Merger
was voted down, they could attempt to acquire Clearwire in the near future on more favorable
terms. Sprint and Softbank repeatedly told Clearwire's management and its stockholders that, if
the merger was not approved, they would take control of the Clearwire Board, dribble out
financing to keep Clearwire out of bankruptcy, and [*85] gradually increase Sprint's ownership
stake.264 After the standstill provision of the Equityholders' Agreement expired in November
2013, Sprint and Softbank could acquire Clearwire without the approval of Clearwire's minority
stockholders.265 They could even structure the acquisition as a tender offer followed by a
short-form merger, as Son threatened to do.266
The evidentiary record as a whole indicates that Sprint and Softbank would have followed
through on these threats. On May 5, 2013, Sprint's finance committee reviewed a proposal to
issue Clearwire an additional $1 billion in convertible debt with an exchange price of $2.00 per
share. This proposal was based on the funding assumptions of earlier Sprint projections and
represented a fraction of the financing called for by the Full Build Projections. Sprint
management presented this same financing proposal to Sprint's board of directors on May 30.267
In that May 30 meeting, Sprint's board also received a detailed overview of the company's plans
in the event that the Clearwire-Sprint merger was voted down. Management told Sprint's
directors that Sprint's "2014 4G payments [are] estimated to be approximately $500M."268 The
Full Build [*86] Projections forecasted $1.2 billion in 4G payments in 2014.269 The same
presentation also stated that Sprint's "Status Quo" included "[e]xercise all rights (e.g. change
board)," "[c]onsider increasing ownership stake post Standstill," and ongoing "[c]oncerns
regarding viability of Clearwire as a standalone entity without additional wholesale customers or
financing."270 All of these proposals suggested a plan to keep Clearwire barely solvent while
preparing to acquire Clearwire in the future. None are consistent with the Full Build Projections.
Further support comes from the materials that Sprint management presented to Sprint's board at
its meeting on June 17, 2013, when the directors authorized the $5.00 per share offer. Sprint
management stated that Sprint's fallback position if it did not acquire Clearwire was "a
commercial agreement that would provide access to 2.5 GHz."271 Sprint management also said
that "[t]here was also a possible path to acquiring Clearwire at a later date at a reasonable
price."272 Sprint could not have acquired Clearwire at a "reasonable price" (relative to the
$5.00 per share that management asked Sprint's board to authorize) after transferring billions of
dollars in value to Clearwire under the Full [*87] Build Projections. The context suggests that
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the commercial agreement management had in mind was a far more limited agreement along the
lines presented to Sprint's Board as the "Status Quo" during the May 30 meeting.
The Full Build Projections did not represent Sprint's plans for Clearwire if the Clearwire-Sprint
Merger did not close. Sprint management created the Full Build Projections to convince
Softbank to increase the merger consideration by showing what Sprint's business would look like
if the merger failed and Sprint nevertheless decided—contrary to the evidence—to use
Clearwire's spectrum as Sprint would have if the merger had closed. Sprint and Softbank would
not have done that. The Full Build Projections did not reflect Clearwire's operative reality on the
date of the merger.

b. The Single Customer Case
Unlike the Full Build Projections, the Single Customer Case was prepared by Clearwire's
management in the ordinary course of business. Clearwire's management had significant
experience preparing long-term financial projections, and they regularly updated the Single
Customer Case to reflect changes to Clearwire's operative reality.273 They last updated the
Single Customer Case [*88] in May 2013 to account for both the Sprint-Softbank Transaction
and the then-postponed Accelerated Build.
The key assumptions of the Single Customer Case matched Clearwire's operative reality on the
date of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. The Single Customer case assumed that (i) Sprint would
remain Clearwire's only customer, and (ii) Sprint's wholesale payments to Clearwire would
increase significantly, but not astronomically, in the future. Aurelius does not challenge the first
assumption. Clearwire had tried for years to obtain additional customers for years, without
success. There was no reason to believe that it would have greater success going forward.
The evidence supports the reasonableness of the amounts that Clearwire management projected
for Sprint's wholesale payments. The Single Customer Case forecasted that Sprint would
increase its wholesale purchases by over 500% by 2020, or a 22% compound annual growth
rate.274 This large increase accounted for growing customer demand for wireless data and
Clearwire's progress in building out a LTE network.
Aurelius argues that Clearwire management should have increased its tonnage forecasts further
to account for the Sprint-Softbank [*89] Transaction or the prospect of the Accelerated Build.
Clearwire's management updated the Single Customer Case in November 2012 and May
2013.275 On both occasions, they considered whether to increase the tonnage forecasts and
decided against it.276 Those decisions were reasonable. Clearwire management believed that
Sprint was unlikely to dramatically increase its use of Clearwire's spectrum unless Sprint
acquired Clearwire.277 As discussed above, this belief was accurate. Clearwire's status quo
would not have changed dramatically if the Clearwire-Sprint Merger was voted down. Sprint and
Softbank would have laid the groundwork for a future acquisition by solidifying their control
over the Clearwire Board and gradually increasing their ownership interest in Clearwire through
rights offerings and dilutive financings. While customer demand would have required Sprint to
make greater use of Clearwire's spectrum in the interim, Sprint would not have paid Clearwire
tens of billions of dollars in wholesale payments.
Aurelius also argues that that the Single Customer Case was too low in light of two sets of
internal projections that Sprint's board reviewed in September 2012 when considering the SprintSoftbank [*90] Transaction. One set, titled "Long Term Plan — Outlook," forecasted usagebased payments for Clearwire's existing WiMAX network and the LTE network under
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construction (the "Long Term Projections"). Sprint management told the board that the
projections "assume[] that [Clearwire] is self-funding and will reimburse [Sprint] for the costs of
deploying 2.5 GHz on 24K [Sprint] sites and [Sprint] will pay $6/GB for 2.5 GHz LTE
traffic."278
The second set of projections was titled "Long Term Plan — Outlook with 2.5 GHz Build" (the
"Build Projections"). The Build Projections assumed that (i) Sprint would host Clearwire's 2.5
GHz spectrum on 24,000 Sprint-owned cell tower sites; (ii) Sprint would pay for the build-out of
these sites; (iii) Sprint would pay Clearwire $3.5 billion over the next four years to keep
Clearwire solvent, and (iv) Sprint would pay nothing to use the spectrum hosted on Sprint's cell
tower sites.279 Because of this last assumption, the Build Projections forecasted that Clearwire
would receive only $1.65 billion in Sprint wholesale revenue from 2013 through 2016, even less
than under the Single Customer Case.
Although the Long Term Projections and the Build Projections forecasted [*91] greater tonnage
than the Single Customer Case, neither was likely to be implemented. The Long Term
Projections were intended as "an extrapolation of current trends" and were not "an operational
plan."280 The Build Projections assumed unrealistically that Sprint could access Clearwire's
spectrum for free in exchange for financing the build-out of Clearwire's LTE network. By spring
2013, Sprint regarded the Build Projections as unrealistic.281
The Single Customer Case is the most reliable set of projections for assessing Clearwire's
operative reality on the date of the Clearwire-Sprint Merger. This decision adopts Cornell's use
of the Single Customer Case in his DCF valuation.

2. Perpetuity Growth Rate
The only other significant difference between Cornell and Jarrell's DCF analyses is the
perpetuity growth rate.282 Cornell adopted a perpetuity growth rate of 3.35%, which represents
the mid-point of inflation and GDP growth. Jarrell used a perpetuity growth rate of 4.5%, which
represents expected GDP growth.
HN29 "Without a valid explanation, the use of a generic growth rate is inherently flawed and
unreasonable."283 Jarrell primarily justified his use of GDP growth on Clearwire's strong
performance [*92] under the Full Build Projections.284 Because this decision has rejected the
Full Build Projections, it rejects Jarrell's proposed perpetuity growth rate.
Cornell's chose the mid-point between inflation and GDP growth because it "take[s] account of
all possibilities, from Clearwire becoming "very successful" to it continuing to "struggle along to
stay out of bankruptcy."285 Cornell's choice of the mid-point is, if anything, generous for
Clearwire given the likelihood that Clearwire would likely require ongoing financing from Sprint
to remain solvent under the Single Customer Case.286 This decision adopts Cornell's 3.35%
rate.

3. Discount Rate
The discount rate drives less than 1% of the difference between Jarrell and Cornell's
determinations of fair value.287 Both reach differing conclusions on issues that cut for and
against their clients.288 In light of the minimal impact that the discount rate has on the DCF
valuation, this decision will not parse these issues. On the whole, Cornell's analysis is persuasive.
This decision [*93] adopts his discount rate of 12.44%.289
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4. Unused Spectrum
Aurelius and Sprint agree that a DCF valuation of Clearwire should add value for Clearwire's
unused spectrum.290 They also agree that Clearwire had 40 MHz of unused spectrum,291
and that DISH's offer to purchase a 40 MHz portfolio in December 2012 (the "DISH Proposal")
provides a relevant data point for valuing Clearwire's unused spectrum.
Cornell valued Clearwire's unused spectrum based strictly on the DISH Proposal. The gross
value of the DISH Proposal was $2.46 billion. Less deductions for spectrum leases and tax
leakage, Cornell estimated that the DISH Proposal would yield net proceeds of approximately
$1.98 billion. Cornell adopted this figure as the value of Clearwire's unused spectrum.
Sprint supported Cornell's opinion with a hedonic regression analysis of FCC auction data
prepared by Sprint's spectrum valuation expert, Scott Wallsten. Wallsten's regression indicated
that Clearwire's 2.5 GHz spectrum holdings were worth $.24 per MHz-pop.292 This figure
aligned closely with the DISH Proposal, which valued Clearwire's spectrum at approximately
$.22 per MHz-pop. Wallsten's regression also aligned with other third-party [*94] offers for
Clearwire's 2.5 GHz-spectrum around the valuation date.293
Aurelius valued Clearwire's unused spectrum using a complicated model prepared by its
valuation expert, Coleman Bazelon. Bazelon's analysis proceeded in three steps. First, Bazelon
calculated the national average price of AWS, a spectrum band close to the 2.5 GHz spectrum
band. Bazelon based his calculation on a June 28, 2013 transaction in which T-Mobile purchased
10 MHz of AWS spectrum in the Mississippi Valley region from US Cellular for $.96/MHz-pop
(the "US Cellular Sale"). Bazelon made a geographic adjustment to this figure and determined
that the national average price for AWS spectrum in July 2013 was $1.69 per MHz-pop.
Second, Bazelon converted the national average price for AWS spectrum into a national average
price of 2.5 GHz spectrum. To complete this step, Bazelon relied on an engineering model
prepared by Andrew Merson, another expert retained by Aurelius. Merson's model calculated the
costs associated with deploying different bands of spectrum. According to Merson's model, the
$1.69 per MHz-pop national average price of AWS implied that the national average price of 2.5
GHz spectrum was $.76 per [*95] MHz-pop at the time of the valuation date.
Third, Bazelon converted the national average price of 2.5 GHz spectrum into a value for the
Clearwire license holdings covered by the DISH Proposal. Adjusting for geography, Bazelon
concluded that this spectrum was worth an average of $.78 per MHz-pop. This produced a total
value for Clearwire's excess spectrum of approximately $8.43 billion. By comparison, Cornell's
DCF analysis under the Single Customer Case, including his addition of $1.98 billion for a sale
of excess spectrum, produced an enterprise value for Clearwire of $7.15 billion.
Bazelon's methodology relied on an extraordinary number of assumptions. To reach his
conclusion that Clearwire's excess spectrum was worth $.78 per MHz-pop, Bazelon made $1.68
in adjustments. For his valuation to be accurate, all of the following must be true:
• AWS spectrum is an appropriate comparable to 2.5 GHz spectrum.294
• The US Cellular Sale reflected the intrinsic value of the AWS spectrum sold in the
transaction.295
• The US Cellular Sale, one transaction for local spectrum licenses, is sufficient to determine the
national average value of AWS spectrum and, in turn, 2.5 GHz spectrum.296
• Merson's model, a complicated product that also depended on a litany of assumptions, was
accurate.297
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Bazelon's result is also starkly divorced from the market evidence. No third party has ever
offered anything close to $.78 per MHz-pop for any of Clearwire's spectrum. Offers from 2011
until the Clearwire-Sprint Merger ranged from $.17 to $.30 per MHz-pop.298 The DISH
Proposal valued Clearwire's excess spectrum at $.22 per MHz-pop. Aurelius tries to distinguish
the third-party bids for Clearwire's spectrum as initial offers, rather than final sales prices, but
this distinction cannot explain the vast gulf between these bids and Bazelon's calculation.
Aurelius also highlights a single e-mail from January 2013 where a Sprint executive estimated
that Clearwire's spectrum was worth $1.60-2.40 per MHz-pop.299 There is no evidence in the
record as to how the Sprint executive reached these figures,300 but in any event this
unsupported valuation is outweighed by the market evidence.
Aurelius next cites Clearwire presentations to ratings agencies and investors from 2009 to 2011
that assigned a higher value to Clearwire's spectrum,301 but Clearwire's representations are not
the same as market evidence. [*97] Clearwire was in fact unable to consummate a spectrum sale
because no buyer ever offered anywhere close to the price that Clearwire demanded.
Finally, Aurelius points to recent Sprint transactions and presentations that assigned a greater
value for Clearwire's 2.5 GHz. But these Sprint materials accounted for developments after the
valuation date, including technological improvements and the emergence of an ecosystem for 2.5
GHz spectrum. The recent Sprint materials are not persuasive evidence of the value of
Clearwire's spectrum as of July 8, 2013.
Bazelon's speculative and assumption-laden methodology is not persuasive. This decision adopts
Cornell's valuation based on the DISH Proposal.

5. The Result of the DCF Valuation
As noted, HN31 it is "entirely proper for the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's
model, methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation is supported by
credible evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis on the record."302 The court adopts
Cornell's DCF valuation in full. The fair value for Clearwire on the date of the merger was $2.13
per share.

IV. CONCLUSION
The defendants proved for purposes of the fiduciary analysis that the [*98] Clearwire-Sprint
Merger was entirely fair. They also proved for purposes of the appraisal proceeding that the fair
value of Clearwire on the closing date was $2.13 per share. The legal rate of interest,
compounded quarterly, shall accrue on the appraised value from the date of closing until the date
of payment. The parties shall cooperate on preparing a final order for the court. If there are
additional issues for the court to resolve before a final order can be entered, the parties shall
submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them and recommends a schedule for
bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court level.
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